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Straight Outta SCOTUS: Domestic 
Violence, True Threats, and Free Speech 
JESSICA MILES* 
Domestic violence intersects with constitutional, 
criminal, and civil law in ways that often present challenges 
for jurists seeking to reconcile conflicting interests in 
promoting victim safety and protecting the legal rights of 
those accused of abuse. One current issue presenting such 
tensions relates to “true threats” of violence which the U.S. 
Supreme Court considers to be among the categories of 
speech receiving only limited First Amendment protection. 
The Supreme Court has yet to indicate what level of intent 
would be constitutionally sufficient for conviction of a 
speaker of a true threat and the circuit courts have split on 
this issue. While a decision on the constitutionally requisite 
mens rea for a true threat will impact a broad range of 
individuals and groups, it will have a substantial effect on 
domestic violence victims. Domestic violence victim 
advocates have generally argued that offering minimal free 
speech protections for true threats will best serve victims’ 
interests and, in the context of civil protection order cases, 
this approach is indeed optimal. However, victims hold 
varying perspectives on the desirability of criminal 
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Andrew Budzinski, Michael Coenen, Kip Cornwell, Julie Dahlstrom, Andrew 
Gilden, Thomas Healy, Negar Katirai, Laurie Kohn, Sherley Kruz, Jennifer J. Lee, 
Solangel Maldonado, Katherine Moore, Lori Nessel, Mariela Olivares, Jon 
Romberg, and Charles Sullivan for feedback on earlier drafts. I would also like to 
express my appreciation to Elizabeth Caldera, Hafsa Mansoor, and Hannah Teller 
for their invaluable research assistance. Finally, thanks most of all to my 
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prosecution as a response to domestic violence. Moreover, 
rhetorical threats of violence can add value to political 
protest speech, as seen in rap music and other art forms, and 
thereby aid efforts to combat broader societal problems 
which contribute to domestic violence. As a result, a low 
mens rea standard for true threats in all cases would 
undermine the goals of many domestic violence victims and 
could chill public dissent on issues impacting them. 
Supreme Court precedents addressing other categories 
of unprotected speech, particularly defamation, offer useful 
guidance on the resolution of this question. Specifically, the 
Court’s caselaw suggests that applying a heightened mens 
rea requirement for public protest context threats—threats 
against public officials or figures communicated in a public 
forum as part of a discussion on matters of public concern—
versus lower intent standards for threats in other contexts 
represents the optimal balance between protecting threat 
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Domestic violence advocacy in the United States over the last 
several decades has produced sweeping legal changes in numerous 
areas including family law, immigration, and civil protection orders, 
bringing substantial relief to many victims.1 As Congress and state 
legislatures have acted to combat domestic violence, courts have 
been presented with difficult questions related to balancing the 
promotion of safety for domestic violence victims with the 
protection of constitutional rights for those accused of abuse.2 First 
Amendment speech protections currently exemplify one such area 
of tension. In recent years, defendants in a number of criminal 
prosecutions and civil protection order cases have raised free speech 
 
 1 See, e.g., Green Card for VAWA Self-Petitioner, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-vawa-self-
petitioner (last updated July 26, 2018) (explaining path to citizenship for victims 
of domestic violence under the Violence Against Women Act); Catherine F. Klein 
& Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis 
of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (providing a 
survey of civil protection order statutes in all fifty states); Nancy K.D. Lemon, 
Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How 
Effective Are They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 606–13 (2001) (describing 
developments and implementation of rebuttable presumptions against award of 
custody to batterers in many states). 
 2 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57, 60 (2004); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 
188–89 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil 
Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17, Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5224) (“Davis and Hammon illustrate the similar 
pressure on courts to expand the definition of ‘nontestimonial.’”); Brief of Amici 
Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of 
Respondents at 16, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-524) 
(“Adopting an overly expansive view of ‘testimonial’ statements . . . will convert 
this ‘shield’ into a sword to be wielded by batterers to silence their victims . . . “). 
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arguments when accused of threatening, stalking, or harassing their 
current or former intimate partners.3 Domestic violence victims are 
increasingly facing threats via the Internet and social media 
platforms, further clouding the lines between constitutionally 
protected speech and acts of abuse subject to legal regulation.4 
For example, consider the case of Melissa, a high school senior 
who just went through a bad breakup with her boyfriend, Anthony.5 
One morning, Melissa gets texts from several friends stating that 
Anthony has just posted a new rap song on his public SoundCloud 
page that does not mention Melissa’s name but uses language 
suggesting that he’s threatening her. Melissa then visits Anthony’s 
SoundCloud page and sees that Anthony has changed his profile 
picture—it now shows him holding a gun pointed at the camera. She 
plays the new song and hears Anthony rapping the following lyrics: 
You fucked up my life 
Put a knife in my lungs 
I don’t give about a fuck about a bitch 
Pull my gun 
 
 3 See, e.g., State v. B.A., 205 A.3d 1130, 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2019) (rejecting a defendant’s challenge to stalking statute as vague and 
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment in a domestic violence case); 
People v. McPheeters, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(concerning a defendant who argued that the trial court erred when it failed to 
instruct the jury to consider free speech arguments in a prosecution based on the 
defendant’s threat to kill his ex-girlfriend in front of a police officer); State v. 
Oliveros, No. 28935, 2010 WL 3433557, at *9 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010) 
(concerning a defendant who argued that the trial court failed to comply with First 
Amendment requirement to instruct the jury of an objective standard for true 
threats in the prosecution of the defendant for threatening to kill his girlfriend). 
 4 See Megan L. Bumb, Domestic Violence Law, Abusers’ Intent, and Social 
Media: How Transaction-Bound Statutes are the True Threats to Prosecuting 
Perpetrators of Gender-Based Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 917, 929 (2017) (“A 
survey conducted by the National Network to End Domestic Violence in 2012 
revealed that . . . almost 90% of [domestic violence] agencies had had victims 
report being threatened through technology; one third of those threats occurred on 
social media and Facebook.”). 
 5 Melissa is a fictional name, but her experiences are based on the lives of 
women I have represented in practice. 
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Put it to your fucking head 
Now you’re dead 
My shit is too hot though 
Guns to your head 
El Chapo 
Melissa agrees with her friends that the song is about her, and 
she is frightened. Melissa seeks a civil protection order against 
Anthony. Anthony argues that he is an aspiring rapper with a First 
Amendment right to post the new song—which he claims is about 
no one in particular—and that the Constitution prevents the court 
from using his lyrics as the basis for an order against him. In 
deciding whether to enter a civil protection order against Anthony, 
the court must somehow reconcile the goal of domestic violence 
prevention and the protection of free speech rights.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court announced that “true threats” were 
among the categories of speech left unprotected by the First 
Amendment in a 1969 per curiam opinion, Watts v. United States.7 
However, the Court in Watts did not define “true threats.”8 The 
Supreme Court next addressed the issue of true threats in 2003, in 
Virginia v. Black, commenting that “true threats encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
 
 6 Abuse Defined: What is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2020) (“Domestic violence (also called intimate partner violence (IPV), 
domestic abuse or relationship abuse) is a pattern of behaviors used by one partner 
to maintain power and control over another partner in an intimate relationship.”). 
Use throughout this Article of the female pronoun to refer to plaintiffs or domestic 
violence victims and the male pronoun to refer to defendants or perpetrators of 
domestic violence reflects recent statistics indicating that approximately 85% of 
victims are women and the vast majority of perpetrators of domestic violence 
against women are male. See Alissa Scheller, At Least A Third of All Women 
Murdered in the U.S. Are Killed By Male Partners, HUFFPOST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/men-killing-women-domesti_n_5927140 (last 
updated Dec. 6, 2017). This usage is not intended in any way to deny or minimize 
the plight of male or non-binary victims or the problems of female or non-binary 
perpetrators. 
 7 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 8 See generally id. 
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expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.”9 Beyond that 
sentence, however, the Court gave little attention to the definition of 
true threats, ultimately deciding the case on unrelated grounds.10 
Following Watts, many circuit courts adopted an “objective test” to 
determine whether a statement constituted a true threat,11 and the 
circuits have continued to utilize this test following Black.12 Under 
the objective test, the fact finder asks if a reasonable listener, or, in 
some jurisdictions, a reasonable speaker or a reasonable person, 
would find the communication at issue to be threatening.13 The 
objective test does not address the mens rea of an individual speaker 
accused of uttering a true threat.14 In contrast to the general 
consensus on applying an objective test to true threats,15 the circuit 
courts split sharply on how to treat the element of the requisite, 
subjective mens rea of the speaker.16 State courts have split on this 
issue as well.17 
 
 9 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (explaining that the speaker 
need not intend to carry out a threat; rather, it is enough that disruption and fear 
were caused by the true threat). 
 10 Id. at 347–48 (resolving the case by holding that the statutory provision 
was unconstitutional because it treated “any cross burning as prima facie evidence 
of intent to intimidate”). 
 11 See, e.g., United States v. Alabound, 347 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“Thus, the offending remarks must be measured by an objective standard.”). 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 987 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that Black did not introduce a subjective test for true threat analyses); 
United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that Black 
did not implement a subjective test, thus applying an objective true threat 
analysis); United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing 
the inadequacy of a subjective test). 
 13 See infra Section I.A; see also Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and 
the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2006) (“The test typically comes 
in one of three forms. The variations are based on whether the perspective of the 
test is that of a reasonable speaker, a reasonable listener, or a ‘neutral’ reasonable 
person.”). 
 14 See Crane, supra note 13, at 1235. 
 15 See, e.g., United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2011); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 507–08 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 16 Compare, e.g., Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118 (interpreting Black as 
requiring that the “speaker subjectively intend the speech as a threat”), with White, 
670 F.3d at 507–08 (requiring only that the speaker intend to communicate a 
statement that meets the objective test for true threats). 
 17 See infra Section II.B. 
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Many lawyers and commentators18 expected the Supreme Court 
to resolve the circuit court split as to this mens rea issue in the 2015 
case of Elonis v. United States, but the Court ultimately decided the 
case on statutory grounds.19 The eventual resolution of this question 
will have a significant effect on domestic violence victims because 
of the frequency with which they endure perpetrators’ threats and 
the devastating emotional and financial toll that such threats exact.20 
The Supreme Court specifically noted the importance of true threat 
jurisprudence for domestic violence victims during oral argument in 
Elonis.21 For example, Justice Alito asked Elonis’s attorney, “What 
do you say to the amici who say that if [a subjective knowledge or 
purpose to threaten standard] is adopted, this is going to have a very 
grave effect in cases of domestic violence?”22 Commentators agree 
that the Supreme Court will likely feel compelled to revisit the 
constitutional question left unaddressed in Elonis as the Internet 
 
 18 See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Do Online Death Threats Count as Free Speech?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/do-
online-death-threats-count-as-free-speech.html; Clay Calvert et al., Opinion, Rap 
Lyrics or True Threats? It’s Time for the High Court to Decide, FORBES (May 24, 
2014, 12:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/24/rap-lyrics-
or-true-threats-its-time-for-the-high-court-to-decide/#1e2a42525601; Justices 
Weigh Limits of Free Speech Over Internet, FOX NEWS, 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/justices-weigh-limits-of-free-speech-over-
internet (last updated Dec. 20, 2015); Vauhini Vara, The Nuances of Threats on 
Facebook, NEW YORKER (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nuances-threat-facebook. 
 19 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015). 
 20 See infra Parts II, IV. 
 21 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 
(2015) (No. 13-983) [hereinafter Elonis Oral Argument] (statement of Justice 
Breyer expressing his concern that “a lot of [true threat] cases would come up in 
the context of domestic relations disputes”). The Court also accepted two amicus 
briefs from attorneys and service providers on behalf of domestic violence 
victims. See Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence, 
et al. in Support of Respondent, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) 
(No. 13-983) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, et al.]; Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment 
and Appeals Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) 
[hereinafter Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals 
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae]. 
 22 Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 60. 
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renders criminal charges for threats more common.23 The Court will 
not lack opportunities to decide the proper test for a true threat—
cases raising this question continue to be litigated, with unsuccessful 
defendants regularly seeking certiorari.24 
Legal scholarship has rarely examined the resolution of the 
circuit court split on true threats from the perspective of a domestic 
violence victim.25 Of those domestic violence victims advocates that 
have addressed this issue, some have argued that victims’ interests 
are best served if minimal First Amendment protection, namely 
requiring only the intent to communicate objectively threatening 
words, applies to all true threats cases, whether civil or criminal.26 
Victim advocates correctly note that adoption of a subjective intent 
to threaten requirement for true threats could limit access of many 
victims to civil protection orders, as civil protective order standards 
in some states rely upon criminal statutes or caselaw.27 A heightened 
mens rea requirement would also hinder the ability of some victims 
to seek criminal prosecution of their former intimate partners for 
abuse.28 
 
 23 See e.g., Cameron L. Fields, Note, Unraveling a Ball of Confusion: Layers 
of Criminal Intent, Facebook, Rap, and Uncertainty in Elonis v. United States, 
135 S. CT. 2001 (2015), 36 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV. 133, 169 (2017) (discussing 
how Elonis failed to answer many questions about true threat analysis); Fernando 
L. Diaz, Note, Trolling & the First Amendment: Protecting Internet Speech in the 
Era of Cyberbullies & Internet Defamation, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 135, 
138 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court will be petitioned to hear more cases like U.S. 
v. Elonis, where Internet speech challenges traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 190 A.3d 
1146 (Pa. 2018) (No. 18-949), denying cert. 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) [hereinafter 
Knox Writ of Cert.]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Sibley, No. 1 CA-CR 
17-0768, 2018 WL 2440236 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 31, 2018) (No. 18-1001), 
denying cert. 139 S. Ct. 1348 (2019). 
 25 But see Bumb, supra note 4, at 950 (“[T]he issue domestic violence victim 
advocates need to address is how to establish that [abusers] knew the threatening 
nature of [their] posts . . .”). 
 26 See, e.g., Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals 
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 30–31 
(“[A] ruling that the First Amendment requires proof of subjective intent in 
prosecutions for domestic abuse threats would jeopardize the protections afforded 
victims . . .”); Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 21–22. 
 27 See infra Section II.B. 
 28 See infra Section II.C. 
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This Article, however, argues that while an interpretation of the 
First Amendment requiring a minimal subjective test for true threats 
in civil protection order cases is constitutionally sufficient and 
comports with the goals of domestic violence victims, the same low 
mens rea standard in criminal cases conflicts with the preferences of 
many victims. First, many victims disfavor reliance on criminal law 
as a means of preventing and remedying harm from domestic 
violence.29 Second, a legal rule which enhances the likelihood of 
criminal convictions in all true threat cases, including those not 
involving domestic violence, contributes to the problem of mass 
incarceration, which has had a profoundly negative impact on the 
communities in which many domestic violence victims live.30 Third, 
vigorous First Amendment protections for political protest speech, 
including rhetorical threats of violence, help to safeguard public 
expression of social justice outrage on issues of importance to 
domestic violence victims.31 In this regard, rap music offers some 
helpful insight into free speech concerns with a subjective test 
requiring minimal intent.32 
This Article provides a legal framework, attuned to the interests 
and perspectives of domestic violence victims, aimed at limiting the 
frequency of true threats of violence while also respecting freedom 
of speech principles and the intersectional identities of domestic 
violence victims.33 This Article argues that, rather than imposing a 
 
 29 See infra Section II.C. 
 30 See infra Section II.C. 
 31 See infra Part III. 
 32 See, e.g., N.W.A., Fuck tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON 
(Ruthless Records & Priority Records 1988); see also infra Section IV.A.3. Other 
scholars have addressed issues of misogyny in rap which, while beyond the scope 
of this Article, are nonetheless important to note. See, e.g., Sarah Rogerson, Using 
Hip-Hop’s Lyrical Narrative to Inform and Critique the Family Justice System in 
HIP HOP AND THE LAW 219, 227 n.2 (Pamela Bridgewater et al., eds. 2015) 
(“[G]angsta rap . . . tends to be less articulate regarding contemporary social 
issues and more focused on ‘thug’ or ‘gang’ culture of violence, materialism, and 
misogyny.”). 
 33 “Intersectionality is defined as “the interconnected nature of social 
categorizations such as race, class, and gender as they apply to a given individual 
or group, regarded as creating overlapping and independent systems of 
discrimination or disadvantage.” Intersectionality, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011); see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989). 
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single, overarching standard to achieve the proper balance between 
deterring violent threats and protecting free speech, the Court should 
instead draw upon the framework of defamation law to apply 
varying mens rea standards to true threats depending upon the 
communication target, context of delivery, and type of potential 
liability.34 Part I provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on true threats and the circumstances in which threats 
of violence may receive some level of constitutional protection. Part 
II describes the prevalence of threats in the context of domestic 
violence, as well as the emotional and financial costs of such threats 
for victims. It also highlights the potential for a constitutionally 
required, heightened mens rea standard to limit legal relief for 
domestic violence victims seeking civil protection orders and details 
victims’ diverse viewpoints regarding criminal prosecution of their 
current and former intimate partners. Part III explains how an 
examination of the Supreme Court’s standards for other unprotected 
speech categories, specifically defamation, and, to a lesser extent, 
incitement, provides helpful insight into the rules that optimally 
balance interests in free speech and protection of victims from the 
harm caused by true threats. Part IV suggests that the Supreme Court 
adopt a three-tiered approach to the subjective mens rea for true 
threats in addition to requiring communication of words qualifying 
as true threats pursuant to the objective test. Specifically, the Article 
first proposes heightened free speech protection (purpose to threaten 
or knowledge to a substantial certainty that a statement will threaten) 
for public protest context threats that encompass threats against 
public officials or figures on matters of public concern when 
 
 34 While this Article focuses on the intersection of true threat jurisprudence 
and domestic violence, it should not be read as suggesting support for a domestic 
violence exceptionalism approach to true threats. “The anti-violence movement 
has long engaged in what has come to be known as ‘domestic violence 
exceptionalism’—the idea that policymakers should care more about people 
subjected to abuse than other victims or trauma or marginalized groups.” LEIGH 
GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY 
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 129 (2018). Rather, I assert that the 
perspective of domestic violence victims should be given significant 
consideration particularly in the context of civil liability for true threats which 
will involve almost exclusively domestic violence civil protection order cases as 
discussed in Section IV.B.2, infra. 
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someone utters those threats in public.35 Second, it suggests an 
intermediate level of protection (recklessness as to whether a 
statement will threaten) in criminal cases for private context threats 
which include any threats against private individuals regardless of 
whether they are uttered in public or in private, as well as threats 
against public officials or figures that are uttered in private.36 
Finally, in civil cases, this Article recommends a lesser standard for 
private context threats of violence against any individual or group, 
requiring only that the speaker intends to communicate the 
objectively threatening words without any need for the speaker to 
also intend to threaten the target of the statement.37 This approach 
best balances domestic violence victim concerns, providing 
significant continued protection to threat victims while also 
allowing for impassioned political protest speech.38 
 
 35 The terms “public protest context threats” and “private context threats” are 
used throughout this Article as a shorthand for the definitions utilized here. 
Although she did not utilize the term “public protest context threats” in this 
specific manner, Judge Marsha S. Berzon provided the inspiration for the term in 
her employment of similar language in her dissent. See Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1105–
08 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 36 To clarify, I argue that a recklessness standard should apply to any criminal 
case involving threats of violence which the speaker communicates privately, (i.e., 
personal cellular telephone voicemail or text message), to a public official or 
figure, regardless of whether the speech also addresses a matter of public concern, 
for reasons discussed infra Section IV.B. Private individual is used here to refer 
to anyone not qualifying as a public official or figure. 
 37 Civil cases involving true threats will almost all involve domestic violence 
civil protection orders but will also include, in some jurisdictions, other civil stay 
away orders, for victims of non-intimate partner abuse, as well as negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 38 Two other jurists have suggested that true threat standards should draw 
upon Supreme Court precedent on defamation, albeit in different ways than 
proposed in this Article. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 
Inc., 244 F.3d at 1107 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (suggesting that for true threats 
against public officials or public figures and on matters of public concern, the 
court should require subjective intent on the part of the speaker along with an 
objective test that specific victims understand communication as an unequivocal 
threat that the speaker would physically harm them but not addressing other types 
of true threats); Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. 
U. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 59 (2015) (arguing for a recklessness standard for online 
threats against public figures or on public issues versus a negligence standard for 
threats involving private individuals). 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF TRUE THREAT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Unprotected Speech 
The First Amendment dictates that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”39 Jurists have discussed 
and debated the importance of various rationales underlying the 
Constitution’s protection of speech, including the promotion of self-
government, support for autonomy, facilitation of the search for 
truth, and provision of a safety-value for unlawful impulses.40 The 
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the key role of respect 
for political speech in First Amendment interpretation, describing 
the First Amendment’s focus as protection of “the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”41 Moreover, the government cannot prohibit 
speech or expressive conduct merely because society finds it 
“offensive or disagreeable,”42 or because people find it to be 
“hurtful.”43 
 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 40 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (noting the marketplace of ideas rationale for First Amendment 
protection and stating “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market . . .”); Anne Klinefelter, First Amendment Limits on 
Library Collection Management, 102 L. LIBR. J. 343, 347 (2010) (noting goals 
underlying the First Amendment include “citizen oversight of government”); C. 
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 1001 (1978) (observing that the rationale for protecting speech draws 
from “ethical requirement that the integrity and autonomy of the individual moral 
agent must be respected”); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in 
the First Amendment, 43 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 n.18 (1975) (“[T]he first 
amendment serves chiefly as a safety valve, permitting peaceful reform within a 
stable system-or, . . . preventing revolution through ‘repressive tolerance.’”). 
 41 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also infra Section IV.A.I. 
 42 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“if there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
 43 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (“Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, 
which is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are 
misguided, or even hurtful.”). 
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However, free speech rights are not “absolute at all times and 
under all circumstances.”44 The Supreme Court first announced that 
some categories of speech did not warrant constitutional protection 
in the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.45 In that case, 
Walter Chaplinsky appealed his conviction for violation of a state 
criminal law banning the use of “offensive, derisive or annoying” 
words addressed towards another in public on First Amendment 
grounds.46 The Supreme Court upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction and, 
in explaining its ruling, acknowledged the existence of “certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”47 Unprotected speech categories include 
libel and obscenity as well as “fighting words,” which the Court in 
Chaplinsky defined as “words likely to cause an average addressee 
to fight.”48 Libel, obscenity, and fighting words do not merit 
constitutional protection because “such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them may 
be outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”49 
The Supreme Court first declared that true threats were among 
the categories of unprotected speech in the 1969 case of Watts v. 
United States.50 In 1966, Robert Watts, an African-American 
teenager,51 attended a public rally on the Washington Monument 
 
 44 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well 
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances.”). 
 45 Id. at 572. 
 46 Id. at 569. 
 47 Id. at 571–72. 
 48 Id. at 572–73 (“These [categories of unprotected speech] include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . .”). 
 49 Id. at 572; see also Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978) (Commercial speech also receives less constitutional protection given its 
“subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”). 
 50 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 51 David L. Hudson Jr., 50 Years Ago, the Court Enters the True Threats 
Thicket in Watts v. United States, FREEDOM FORUM INST. (May 7, 2019), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/05/07/50-years-ago-the-court-
enters-the-true-threats-thicket-in-watts-v-united-states/. 
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grounds.52 Watts spoke out during a post-rally discussion stating “I 
have already received my draft classification as 1-A” then declared 
he would not go to Vietnam explaining that the government was 
“not going to make [him] kill [his] black brothers.”53 Watts closed 
out his comments with the rhetorical flourish that resulted in his 
criminal charges: “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I 
want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”54 The group in attendance laughed 
and the discussion ended uneventfully.55 However, the next day, 
Secret Service agents arrested Watts, and prosecutors charged him 
with a felony violation of a federal law banning any “knowing and 
willful” threat to injure or kill the President.56 
A jury convicted Watts and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the 
Supreme Court, however, reversed.57 The Supreme Court found 
Watts’ remark to be “political hyperbole” and reiterated America’s 
“profound national commitment” to vigorous debate on public 
issues.58 Watts’s statement consisted of merely a “crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President.”59 In the 
per curiam opinion, the Court further noted that language in the 
political arena is “often vituperative, abusive and inexact.”60 In 
reaching the conclusion that Watts’s rhetoric did not constitute a true 
threat, the Court considered the context of Watts’s statement as well 
as the statement’s conditional nature and the reaction of the 
listeners.61 The Supreme Court did not, however, offer any detailed 
analysis or define the term “true threat.”62 
The Supreme Court did not return to the issue of true threats until 
2003 in Virginia v. Black.63 In Black, Justice O’Connor focused on 
 
 52 Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Skelly Wright, 
J., dissenting) (“Appellant attended a rally of the W.E.B. DuBois Club at the 
Sylvan Theater on the Washington Monument grounds.”). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 56 Watts, 402 F.2d at 677; see also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1964). 
 57 Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
 58 Id. at 708. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (mentioning “true threat” once, but not defining or analyzing the 
term). 
 63 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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the concept of true threats in just two paragraphs of a lengthy 
plurality opinion.64 The Court ultimately resolved the case on other 
grounds.65 Specifically, the Black Court found a Virginia statute 
criminalizing cross burning with intent to intimidate was 
unconstitutional due to a provision which, as interpreted in a jury 
instruction, improperly treated an act of cross burning alone as 
prima facie evidence of the requisite criminal intent.66 The Court 
noted, however, that the state of Virginia did possess the power to 
ban cross burning “with intent to intimidate” because that type of 
symbolic speech constituted a true threat.67 The plurality then 
offered that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an unlawful act of violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”68 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s limited attention to the issue, 
the circuit courts have decided numerous cases involving true 
threats in the years before and after Black.69 Lower courts have 
found that analyzing whether a statement qualifies as a true threat 
requires two distinct inquiries. First, the fact finder must consider 
whether the words in question are objectively threatening such that 
the speech may fail to warrant constitutional protection.70 With 
respect to this first question, the circuit courts have defined the 
concept of a true threat in similar ways, largely corresponding to the 
language in Black.71 The circuit courts frequently refer to this 
 
 64 Id. at 359–60. 
 65 Id. at 347–48. 
 66 Id. at 347–48, 354, 364–65 (holding that the prima facie evidence provision 
of the statute was improper because cross burning might indicate an intent to 
intimidate or it might suggest a “person is engaged in core political speech” in an 
effort to “communicate . . . shared ideology”). 
 67 Id. at 362. 
 68 Id. at 359. 
 69 See infra notes 72–74. 
 70 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 720, F.3d 411, 426–27 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(affirming lower court jury instructions that instructed that “[w]hether a particular 
statement is a threat is governed by an objective standard.”). 
 71 See e.g., United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2018) (“an 
expression of an intent to inflict loss or harm”); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 
212, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (“serious expression of an intent to do harm”); United 
States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 2014) (“declaration of intention, 
purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict [bodily injury] on another” 
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inquiry as the “objective test” for a true threat because they have 
adopted the viewpoint of either a reasonable speaker, reasonable 
recipient/listener, or just a generic reasonable person to assess 
whether the words at issue may constitute a true threat.72 The 
“objective test” generally looks to the words spoken, as well as to a 
 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Turner, 720 F.3d at 427 (“serious expression 
of an intent to inflict injury”); United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“communications expressing an intent to inflict injury in the present or 
future”); United States v. Stefanik, 674 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2012) (“serious 
expression of intent to inflict bodily injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2009) (“express[ion of] 
an intention to inflict harm, loss, evil, injury, or damage on another”); United 
States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (“serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2003) (“serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Planned 
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“expression of an intention to inflict evil, 
injury, or damage on another” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (communication that “create[s] 
apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 72 Compare, e.g., United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(“this court has applied an objective defendant vantage point standard”); United 
States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 331 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The Fourth Circuit test 
focuses on the reasonable recipient, but our test asks whether a reasonable speaker 
would foresee that statement would be understood as a threat.”), with Turner, 720 
F.3d at 420 (“This Circuit’s test for whether conduct amounts to a true threat is 
an objective one—namely, whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is 
familiar with the context of the [communication] would interpret it as a threat of 
inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);  United States v. White, 670 
F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2012) (“whether the statement amounts to a true threat is 
determined by the understanding of a reasonable recipient familiar with the 
context”); Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“Our court is in the camp that views the nature of the alleged 
threat from the viewpoint of a reasonable recipient.”), and Porter v. Ascension 
Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Speech is a ‘true threat’ and 
therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the 
speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future 
harm.’”); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (“a 
reasonable observer would construe as a true threat to another.”);  United States 
v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 988 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A true threat is determined from 
the position of an objective, reasonable person”), vacated by 135 S. Ct. 2798 
(2015). 
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variety of contextual factors to determine if a statement qualifies as 
a true threat.73 
With respect to the second, subjective inquiry, the fact finder 
must assess whether the speaker of the words at issue had the 
necessary intent to utter or publish a true threat pursuant to the 
relevant statute, or pursuant to the First Amendment if the 
Amendment requires a higher mens rea than the statute.74 On this 
mens rea question, the majority of circuit courts have held that the 
Constitution requires only that a speaker intend to communicate 
particular words—words that the fact finder later determines qualify 
objectively as a true threat; under this standard, the speaker need not 
intend to threaten or intimidate the victim(s) by speaking the 
words.75 Thus, most circuit courts utilize a mens rea standard which, 
in essence, protects only a very small subset of defendants who 
communicate an objective true threat;76 for example, those who 
 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that courts must evaluate alleged threat in light of “entire factual context” 
considering factors including the reaction of the recipient and other listeners to 
the threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe that the speaker had the 
propensity to engage in violence). The objective test does not require a speaker 
have the purpose of acting upon the threat. See United States v. Magleby, 420 
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 
(2003)) (emphasizing that a finding of the speaker’s actual intent to carry out the 
threat is unnecessary because the intent to threaten alone qualifies the speech as a 
true threat if the statement also met the standard of the objective test). 
 74 The existence of a constitutional question regarding the level of intent on 
the part of the speaker of a true threat required by the First Amendment depends 
in each case upon the mens rea indicated in the applicable federal or state law. 
For example, if the relevant law requires only recklessness on the part of the 
speaker, defendants may argue that the First Amendment necessitates a higher 
mens rea for liability on the basis of speech. See, e.g., Doggart, 906 F.3d at 512; 
White, 810 F.3d at 220–21; United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 973 (10th 
Cir. 2014); Turner, 720 F.3d at 426–27; Stock, 728 F.3d at 293–94; Jongewaard, 
567 F.3d at 341; Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828. 
 75 See, e.g., White, 670 F.3d at 511 (requiring only intent to communicate the 
purported true threat, regardless of subjective intent to intimidate). See also 
Clemens, 738 F.3d at 11–12 (summarizing which circuits have considered a 
adopting a subjective intent to threaten requirement after Black and finding that 
the majority of circuits have rejected such a test and instead continued to require 
only a subjective intent to communicate a true threat). 
 76 See, e.g., Thomas DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the 
Objective-Only Approach to 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) in Light of United States v. 
Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 987, 
728 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:711 
deliver a sealed envelope with a true threat from a third party to the 
victim while unaware of its contents or those who have Tourette’s 
Syndrome. Some commentators and litigants have argued that the 
objective test without a corresponding subjective intent to threaten 
requirement imposes a standard akin to negligence for true threats.77 
However, the mens rea approach followed by the majority of circuit 
courts is more fairly characterized as a general intent standard for 
true threats.78 
Two circuits, however, have cited Black in support of finding 
that the First Amendment requires proof of a subjective intent to 
threaten, meaning this mens rea standard is far more demanding 
than the requirement of a subjective intent to communicate words 
that are objectively true threats of violence.79 The Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits have held that the First Amendment requires a speaker to 
have a subjective intent (purpose or knowledge to a substantial 
certainty) to threaten the target of a communication, with words that 
the fact finder later determines meet the objective test for a true 
 
1011 n.246 (2014); Brian Walsh, Comment, Circuits Split as to Statutory 
Interpretation of the Mens Rea Requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2): The Tenth 
Circuit Provides the Correct Answer, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 123, 126–32 (2010). 
 77 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 3–4, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2001 (2015) (No. 13-983). Some courts and commentators discussing the mens 
rea inquiry refer to any requirement of an intent to threaten, as opposed to an 
intent merely to communicate words determined to be threatening, as the 
“subjective test.” See, e.g., Clemens, 738 F.3d at 10–12 (describing the circuit 
split as one over objective and subjective intent); Turner, 720 F.3d at 420 n.4 
(framing the circuit split in the same terms); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 
758, 769 (6th Cir. 2011) (framing the circuit split in the same terms); see also 
Crane, supra note 13, at 1261–69 (describing different courts’ intent tests for true 
threats). However, this narrow use of the term “subjective test” may be misleading 
as it fails to acknowledge that, even in the absence of a requirement to prove a 
subjective intent to threaten, prosecutors must prove a subjective intent to 
communicate a true threat for conviction and cannot simply ignore the question 
of a defendant’s subjective intent after proving the defendant uttered a true threat 
meeting the objective test. 
 78 General intent here is used in this Article to refer to an awareness of the 
factors that constitute the offense which thus encompasses purpose, knowledge, 
or recklessness. 
 79 See Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978 (holding that true threats require both 
objectively threatening speech and a subjective intent to intimidate); United States 
v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a true threat 
must have objectively threatening language and include a subjective intent to 
intimidate). 
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threat, in order for the speech to be constitutionally unprotected and 
for liability to attach.80 While not arising in every true threat case, 
mens rea arguments have been articulated in recent years in part as 
a result of the advent of the Internet and other technologies (i.e., text 
messaging), which lead speakers to argue a lack of subjective intent 
to threaten or even to communicate a true threat based on 
ambiguities inherent in communication through these media.81 
Despite these recent First Amendment arguments in true threat cases 
and the continued circuit court split on the requisite intent for a true 
threat post-Black, the Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of true 
threats for twelve years following Black, until the Elonis case in 
2015.82 
B. Elonis v. United States 
In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-
anticipated opinion in the case of Elonis v. United States.83 The case 
arose when Anthony Douglas Elonis, a man upset following his 
separation from his wife, started posting seemingly threatening rap 
lyrics on his Facebook page.84 Elonis claimed to be an aspiring rap 
artist and his lyrics appeared to threaten to kill his estranged wife as 
well as his former co-workers.85 In response to a posting in which 
Elonis discussed the best place from which to fire a mortar at his 
wife’s house, Elonis’s wife petitioned for relief pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s civil protection order statute and obtained a 
 
 80 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Magleby, 420 
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the threat must be made ‘with the 
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’”). In addition, the 
Seventh Circuit indicated in dicta post-Black that it might also adopt a subjective 
test in an appropriate case. See United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 499–500 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
 81 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (student who purportedly threatened coaches argued he put “the 
recording on Facebook and YouTube . . . to ‘increase awareness of the situation’; 
and . . . did not think the coaches would hear the recording and did not intend it 
to be a threat . . . “). 
 82 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Elonis v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015). 
 83 See generally Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 84 Id. at 2004–05. 
 85 Id. at 2007. 
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Protection From Abuse Order (“PFA”) against him.86 After the entry 
of the PFA, Elonis posted a rap referencing use of explosives to 
“take care” of the state police, along with the following lyrics, which 
his wife viewed as a threat: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?87 
Elonis then moved on to rapping about a school shooting with 
the following post on his Facebook page: 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius 
to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever 
imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in 
a Kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one?88 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI” or “Bureau”) had 
been monitoring Elonis’s Facebook page following contact from his 
former employer.89 After the school shooting post, the FBI sent two 
agents to speak with Elonis; his next Facebook post ostensibly 
threatened to kill the lead FBI agent.90 Federal prosecutors thereafter 
charged Elonis with five counts of violating a federal law 
prohibiting the transmission in interstate commerce of a threat to 
 
 86 Id. at 2006. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. Elonis’s post stated, in relevant part: 
Little Agent lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost . . . 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at 
it . . . . 
Id. 
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injure the person of another.91 At the conclusion of the trial, the 
district court instructed the jury that speech qualifies as a true threat 
under the following circumstances: 
a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a 
context . . . wherein a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by 
those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.92 
Elonis’s conviction was affirmed by the Third Circuit.93 Elonis’s 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari argued that the jury instruction failed 
to reflect the mens rea required by the First Amendment for a true 
threat.94 
Jurists and media commentators had speculated extensively on 
the direction the Court would take in true threat jurisprudence in 
Elonis.95 The Court’s ultimate decision in Elonis did not resolve the 
circuit court split with respect to the mens rea constitutionally 
required for speech to be a true threat.96 Instead, the Supreme Court 
reversed Elonis’s conviction and remanded the case based solely on 
a statutory issue involving congressional intent with respect to the 
requisite mens rea in the applicable federal law.97 The Court stated 
 
 91 Id. Specifically, the government charged Elonis for his threats against his 
estranged wife, the patrons and employees of his former employer, police officers, 
a kindergarten class, and the FBI agent who interviewed him. Id. 
 92 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 93 Id. at 335. 
 94 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28–32, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2001 (2015), No. 13-983. 
 95 See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court To Weigh Facebook Threats, 
Religious Freedom, Discrimination, NPR (October 6, 2014, 4:58 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/10/06/353515078/supreme-court-to-weigh-facebook-
threats-religious-freedom-discrimination (discussing Elonis v. United States from 
3:12 to 5:12); Vauhini Vara, The Nuances of Threats on Facebook, NEW YORKER 
(December 3, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nuances-
threat-facebook. 
 96 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015). 
 97 Id. at 2008–09, 2012 (“The most we can conclude from the language of 
Section 875(e) and its neighboring provisions is that Congress meant to proscribe 
a broad class of threats in Section 875(e), but did not identify what mental state, 
if any, a defendant must have to be convicted.”). 
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“[g]iven our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any First 
Amendment issues.”98 
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in the 
judgment but dissenting in part on grounds related to true threat 
jurisprudence.99 In his partial dissent, Justice Alito argued that the 
majority should have also resolved the question of the requisite mens 
rea for finding a true threat to be constitutionally unprotected 
speech.100 Justice Alito offered his view that the First Amendment 
did not protect true threats uttered recklessly by a speaker because 
those threats “inflict great harm and have little if any social 
value.”101 He also expressed concern regarding the impact of 
requiring knowledge or purpose for a true threat in domestic 
violence cases, noting that domestic violence perpetrators consider 
threats a weapon of choice.102 In regard to Elonis’s claim that the 
First Amendment protected his rap lyrics, including any threats, 
Alito stated that a “fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such 
hurtful, valueless threats into protected speech.”103 
Since the Court decided Elonis, many circuit courts have cited 
the case but most of these decisions have involved interpretation of 
the mens rea required by the same federal criminal statute at issue 
in Elonis and have not considered broader constitutional issues.104 
 
 98 Id. at 2012. 
 99 Id. at 2013–14, 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(concurring that Elonis’ conviction must be vacated and the case remanded in 
light of the lower court’s interpretation of the federal criminal statute as requiring 
only negligence on the part of a defendant). 
 100 Id. at 2013, 2016. 
 101 Id. at 2016. Justice Alito did not address whether the Constitution would 
permit the finding of a true threat based on the lower standard of an intent to 
communicate a true threat currently employed by the majority of circuit courts. 
See id. at 2013–18. 
 102 Id. at 2017 (citing Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 4–16). 
 103 Id. at 2016–17. Alito also rejected Elonis’s “support for autonomy” style 
argument that his speech should be protected because he made the threats to help 
himself deal with the pain in his life. Id. “[T]he fact that making a threat may have 
a therapeutic or cathartic effect for the speaker is not sufficient to justify 
constitutional protection.” Id. at 2016. 
 104 See, e.g., United States v. Hoff, 767 F. App’x 614, 621–22 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(reviewing only for clear error of true threat jurisprudence); Voneida v. Att’y Gen. 
Pa., 738 F. App’x 735, 738–39 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (remanding on 
jurisdictional grounds without deciding requisite mens rea); United States v. 
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Likewise, in state courts, decisions citing Elonis tend to find the case 
not applicable or reference it when rejecting arguments made by 
defendants seeking First Amendment protection for their statements 
that qualified as threats pursuant to state criminal statutes.105 In sum, 
federal and state courts have not substantially shifted their pre-
Elonis positions on the question of whether the First Amendment 
requires merely an intent to communicate a statement objectively 
qualifying as a true threat for the speech to lose constitutional 
protection or whether it demands some level of intent to threaten to 
be considered a true threat. Resolution of the circuit court split 
seems likely to bring the issue to the Supreme Court’s attention 
again. 
II. TRUE THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A significant number of true threat cases involve domestic 
violence and thus consideration of the concerns of domestic 
violence victims will be important in the Supreme Court’s future 
resolution of the question of the constitutionally required mens rea 
for true threats.106 In the United States, “more than one in three 
women . . . have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or 
 
Jordan, 639 F. App’x 768, 769 (2d Cir. 2016) (reviewing only for plain error); 
United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction 
because evidence sufficient to prove any requisite mens rea); United States v. 
Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757, 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction because 
jury instructions properly instructed on the requisite mens reas pursuant to the 
relevant federal statute). 
 105 See, e.g., State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 12 (Conn. 2018) (referencing 
concurrence of Justice Alito in Elonis, as well as Black, in rejecting defendant’s 
assertion that First Amendment requires proof of specific intent to terrorize a 
threat target for criminal conviction); Major v. State, 800 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga. 
2017) (citing Elonis and Black in rejecting argument by defendant that 
“communicating a threat of violence in a reckless manner does not meet the 
definition of a true threat.”); People v. Lewis, No. 4-15-0449, 2017 WL 5443163, 
at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017) (Elonis not applicable because lower court “did 
not instruct jury it could find defendant guilty based on his negligence”). 
 106 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walters, 37 N.E.3d 980 (Mass. 2015) 
(concerning defendant who stalked and harassed his ex-fiancé); Perez v. State, 
No. 08-00253-CR, 2017 WL 1955338 (Tex. Ct. App. May 11, 2017) (concerning 
defendant who stalked and threatened his ex-girlfriend); see also supra note 21. 
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stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetimes.”107 Threats 
represent a key component of the control tactics by which a 
perpetrator of domestic violence attempts to coerce an intimate 
partner into acceding to his demands, including staying or 
reconciling with him despite abuse.108 According to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, almost twenty percent of women in 
the United States report having been threatened with physical harm 
by an intimate partner at some point during their lifetime.109 
A. Particularized Vulnerabilities 
Domestic violence victims are particularly vulnerable to threats 
of physical harm or death from their current or former intimate 
partners in comparison to other threat victims for a number of 
reasons. First, domestic violence victims find threats especially 
frightening because, for them, threats of violence “are reliable 
predictors of physical violence.”110 Statistics and research on 
stalking offer a useful proxy for measuring the impact of threats 
because stalking generally involves threats, whether implicit, 
 
 107 MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER & SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY 
REPORT 2 (2010), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf. 
 108 NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, POWER AND CONTROL 
WHEEL 1 (2019), 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/PowerControlwheelNOSHADING.pdf 
[hereinafter POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL]; see also Mary P. Brewster, Stalking 
by Former Intimates: Verbal Threats and Other Predictors of Physical Violence, 
15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 41, 43 (2000) (noting that most former intimate partners 
who stalk seek reunification with, or revenge against, their former partners). 
 109 SHARON G. SMITH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA 
BRIEF – UPDATED RELEASE 21 (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf. 
 110 Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al., 
supra note 21, at 9. In addition, the correlation between stalking and violence 
persists in studies of homicide cases with at least seventy-five percent of women 
killed by intimate partners having experienced prior stalking by her killer. Andrew 
King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic Violence Wave 
of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 133 (2011). 
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explicit, or both.111 Research on stalking demonstrates that a strong 
correlation exists between intimate partner stalking and physical 
violence, as eighty-one percent of women who were stalked by a 
current or former intimate partner were also physically assaulted by 
that partner.112 Stalking by former intimate partners also involves 
significantly more threats and intrusive behaviors than stalking by 
strangers or acquaintances.113 In addition to an increased risk of 
physical violence, intimate partner stalking victims suffer from high 
rates of anxiety and depression.114 Research suggests that stalking 
by a violent current or former intimate partner causes “greater 
psychological distress” than stalking by a non-violent partner or 
non-partner.115 A threat in the domestic violence context can be 
especially harmful partially because the threat often exacerbates the 
effects of prior abuse, which itself tends to have serious chronic 
mental health consequences.116 Additionally, the emotional harm 
caused by intimate partner threats can extend beyond the distress the 
target feels because threats of violence “may cause serious 
emotional stress for . . . those who care about [the targeted] person,” 
 
 111 Lorraine Sheridan & Karl Roberts, Key Questions to Consider in Stalking 
Cases, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 255, 263 (2011) (“Stalkers frequently threaten their 
victims, either directly or indirectly.”). 
 112 Judith M. McFarlane et al., Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3 
HOMICIDE STUDIES 300, 301 (1999) (citing a National Violence Against Women 
survey). 
 113 Lorraine Sheridan & Graham M. Davies, Violence and the Prior Victim-
Stalker Relationship; 11 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 102, 109–11 (2001). 
 114 TK Logan & Robert Walker, Toward a Deeper Understanding of the 
Harms Caused by Partner Stalking, 25 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 440, 447 (2010) 
(“Women who were stalked had higher global stress scores . . . compared to the 
other two groups.”); see also Mindy B. Mechanic et al., Mental Health 
Consequences of Intimate Partner Abuse: A Multidimensional Assessment of 
Four Different Forms of Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 634, 645 (2008) 
(describing how the study, controlled for effects of other forms of partner abuse, 
demonstrated stalking by current or former intimate partner predicts PTSD 
symptoms). 
 115 TK Logan & Robert Walker, Partner Stalking: Psychological Dominance 
or “Business as Usual”?, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 247, 265 (2009). 
 116 Society for Women’s Health Research, Linking Domestic Violence and 
Chronic Disease: An Issue Not in the Headlines, HUFFPOST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/linking-domestic-violence_b_5884050 (last 
updated Nov. 29, 2014). 
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such as the target’s children.117 Moreover, a threat’s emotional toll 
will often be amplified for a domestic violence victim’s children 
when the person making the threat is their other parent.118 
Second, because domestic violence victims experience higher 
rates of poverty than the general population, they often have fewer 
options to enhance personal safety in response to a threat.119 For 
example, moving to a new home or changing jobs or schools to 
avoid threatened violence are less likely to be options for domestic 
violence victims than for other threat victims.120 Research 
demonstrates that stalking exacts significant financial costs from 
victims who change their residence or  lose time at work.121 The 
 
 117 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Laurie S. Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave? The 
Collision of First Amendment Rights and Effective Court Remedies for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 45, 56 (2001) [hereinafter Kohn, 
Why Doesn’t She Leave?] (highlighting state’s interest in protecting domestic 
violence victims and their children from negative consequences of speech by 
victim’s current or former intimate partner, including partners disclosure of 
immigration status or sexual orientation of the victim). 
 118 For example, children in domestic violence cases suffer a heightened 
emotional toll exacted by the awareness that their father threatened to kill or 
physically harm their mother. See Jayne O’Donnell & Mabinty Quarshie, The 
Startling Toll on Children Who Witness Domestic Violence Is Just Now Being 
Understood, NORTHJERSEY.COM, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/ 
health/2019/01/29/domestic-violence-research-children-abuse-mental-health-
learning-aces/2227218002/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2019, 7:03 PM). In addition, 
because most children in domestic violence households witness abuse, they will 
be able to imagine their father physically harming their mother with a level of 
detail that the children of other threat victims cannot. See id. Given the prevalence 
of post-traumatic stress disorder among children of domestic violence victims, a 
threat may also trigger symptoms including nightmares and panic attacks. See id. 
 119 GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 36 (“[L]ow income women are 
disproportionately represented among people subjected to abuse. As many as two-
thirds of low-income woman are subject to intimate partner violence. The lower 
a woman’s income, the more likely she is to experience intimate partner 
violence.”). 
 120 Id. Even more minor changes, such as leaving work early to evade stalking, 
are less likely to be feasible for a domestic violence victim with a low wage 
position since such jobs frequently offer little flexibility in work hours. See id. at 
37. 
 121 KATRINA BAUM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7 
(2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-
stalking-rpt.pdf (noting that stalking leads one in seven victims to move in an 
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relationship between poverty and the increased likelihood of 
violence is further supported by research that shows that domestic 
violence victims with the fewest resources experience the highest 
rates of repeat abuse.122 
Third, domestic violence victims may feel less comfortable 
contacting the police than other threat victims because there is a 
history of inadequate law enforcement responses to intimate partner 
abuse,123 which is an issue that persists today.124 Moreover, in 
immigrant communities, some victims fear deportation for 
themselves or their partners.125 These concerns have only increased 
 
attempt to escape further stalking.); Brief Amici Curiae the National Network to 
End Domestic Violence, et al., supra note 21, at 10–11 (“More than half of victims 
reported losing at least one week of work” as a result of stalking); Bumb, supra 
note 4, at 940 (explaining that victims oftentimes have to take off from work to 
seek court ordered protection, which also leads to taxpayer dollars being spent to 
investigate abuse); Melanie M. Hughes & Lisa D. Brush, The Price of Protection: 
A Trajectory Analysis of Civil Remedies for Abuse and Women’s Earnings, 80 
AM. SOC. R. 140, 158 (2015) (estimating “that women [seeking civil protection 
orders] lose between $312 and $1,018 . . . through the year after petitioning alone, 
and additional analyses suggest women are not recouping these losses later.”). 
 122 Mechanic et al., supra note 114, at 648. 
 123 See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. 
Conn. 1984) (“[T]he City has failed to put forward any justification for its 
disparate treatment of women.”); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor 
Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992) 
(“The evidence suggests, however, that police are largely indifferent to domestic 
violence, and that they attach to it a very low priority.”). 
 124 See Natalie Schreyer, Too Terrified to Speak Up: Domestic Abuse Victims 
Afraid to Call Police, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/04/09/too-terrified-speak-up-
domestic-abuse-victims-afraid-call-police/479855002/ (last updated Apr. 9, 
2018, 7:33 AM) (“A 2015 survey by the National Domestic Violence Hotline 
found that a quarter of women who had called police to report domestic violence 
or sexual assault would not call again in the future.”); PETER C. HARVEY, INDEP. 
MONITOR, CONSENT DECREE: INDEPENDENT MONITOR – SECOND-YEAR 
REASSESSMENT 9–10 (2018), https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Second-Year-Reassessment_10.12.18.pdf (issuing 
report from independent monitor as part of Consent Decree from United States v. 
Newark (Civil Action No. 16-1731), finding that police department still needed to 
improve response of law enforcement officers, 911 operators, and police 
dispatchers to domestic violence complaints). 
 125 See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims 
Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 26; see also Natalie Nanasi, A Fraught Pairing: 
Immigrant Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence and Law Enforcement, in THE 
738 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:711 
in recent years as immigration policy has changed, causing a 
plummet in the number of domestic violence reports to police.126 
Calls to law enforcement because of domestic violence may also 
lead to other undesirable, and potentially devastating, collateral 
consequences in certain cases, including intervention by local child 
protective services agencies for alleged child neglect.127 In fact, 
police calls to a residence by a victim to stop abuse may also result 
in a landlord seeking to evict the victim via local nuisance 
ordinances.128 
Finally, in the context of criminal or civil domestic violence 
cases alleging threats, First Amendment arguments by a defendant 
will frequently signal that the threat victim is a former, and not a 
current, intimate partner.129 If the victim and defendant remain 
romantically involved, the defendant can threaten his partner with 
violence directly without creating an online evidentiary trail that 
may later be used against him.130 As a result, domestic violence 
perpetrators will not often threaten their current intimate partners in 
a public Internet space. 
 
POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
RESPONSES 202, 207–08 (Jane K. Stoever ed., 2019) (explaining how many non-
citizen individuals do not trust the police out of fear of being treated differently 
because of their immigration status). 
 126 See ASIAN-PACIFIC INST. ON GENDER BASED VIOLENCE ET AL., 
IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS FEAR REPORTING VIOLENCE 1–2 (2019), 
https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Advocate-Survey-
Final.pdf; Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants Are Reporting Domestic Abuse. 
Police Blame Fear of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/immigrants-houston-domestic-
violence.html. 
 127 GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 20. 
 128 Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 849–50 (2015) (“[T]enants, 
who have either themselves contacted police or whose neighbors, family 
members, or friends did so, have been evicted for violating nuisance ordinances 
in connection with their attempts to seek assistance during home violence.”); see 
also GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 42 (“One particularly problematic practice is 
the use of nuisance property laws against people subjected to abuse. Nuisance 
property laws allow police to penalize landlords for their tenants’ behavior . . . . 
Landlords often include evictions or the threat of eviction . . . and use those threats 
to prevent tenants from continuing to seek assistance from the police.”). 
 129 See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–07 (2015). 
 130 Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 4–7 (recounting stories 
of individuals abused and threatened). 
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However, when a domestic violence victim has left her intimate 
partner, the partner often will no longer be able to communicate 
directly with her due to actions she has taken to prevent further 
abuse, such as blocking his cellphone number, moving to a 
confidential address, etc.131 The most effective way for a domestic 
violence perpetrator to convey a threat against his former intimate 
partner will often be via the Internet.132 Then, to avoid liability based 
on that threat, a defendant may try to claim that he made the online 
threat for another audience and/or an innocent purpose (i.e., venting, 
artwork, etc.) and not to intimidate the victim.133 In contrast, a direct 
threat through a private channel is less likely to leave space for a 
constitutional defense.134 In light of research establishing that the 
time post-separation is the most dangerous for a victim in terms of 
her risk of physical assault and homicide,135 a defendant’s free 
speech argument in a domestic violence case (and its general 
implication that the parties have separated) has increased 
significance. In sum, true threat litigation in the domestic violence 
context involves a subset of threat victims who are at a high risk of 
danger of actual violence but who also have generally fewer options 
 
 131 Path to Safety: What is a Safety Plan?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/help/path-to-safety/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2020). 
 132 See Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the 
Global Positioning System, Enhanced 911, and the Internet and Their 
Relationships to the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Abusers, 13 
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97, 120–21 (2004) (discussing the ease and non-existent 
expense for perpetrators to continue their abuse over the Internet). 
 133 See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007 (noting defendant argued he was merely 
emulating rap music). 
 134 See Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 
1310 (1993) (“Whether a particular act or message is . . . entitled to First 
Amendment protection turns on context as well as content.”). 
 135 Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive 
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003) (noting that risk of experiencing violence increases 
significantly after separation of intimate partners); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY 
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 37 (2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (finding that “married women 
who lived apart from their husbands were nearly four times more likely to report 
that their husbands had raped, physically assaulted, and/or stalked them than were 
women who lived with their husbands”). 
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and resources available to protect their safety than other threat 
victims. 
B. Civil Protection Order Impact of True Threat 
Jurisprudence 
For domestic violence victims, any changes in true threat 
jurisprudence will have the most significant impact on civil 
protection orders because victims seek these orders more frequently 
than they pursue criminal charges against their former intimate 
partners.136 In civil protection order cases, domestic violence 
victims overwhelmingly support maximizing access to relief 
because victims retain autonomy in setting the litigation goals; in 
contrast, victims lack such authority in criminal prosecutions.137 
Moreover, because civil cases involving First Amendment 
arguments related to true threats will likely be civil protection order 
matters, the perspective of domestic violence victims should be 
particularly important here.138 
Generally, protection orders for domestic violence victims are 
civil orders, although violation of a civil protection order constitutes 
a crime.139 The essence of a civil protection order is a requirement 
that the defendant stay physically away from the victim and have 
limited or no other contact with her.140 Civil protection orders may 
also provide for ancillary relief, such as child custody and visitation, 
child support, and use and possession of a home.141 The civil 
 
 136 Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic  
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the 
Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503–04 (2008) (“[C]ivil protection 
orders have emerged as the most frequently used . . . legal remedy against 
domestic violence.”). 
 137 Id. at 1508. 
 138 See generally Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117 (discussing 
first amendment issues that abound when judges enjoin speech in civil protection 
order, divorce, or child custody proceedings); see infra Section IV.B.2. 
 139 See Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 10; see also VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2(A) (West 2016); N.Y. FAM. LAW § 812(1) (McKinney 
2019). 
 140 See Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1506 (defining civil protection order as “a 
court order that imposes legally binding restrictions on an offender’s future 
conduct.”). 
 141 Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: 
Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1109 
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protection order process involves an initial ex parte filing seeking a 
temporary order.142 Within a relatively short time frame, a victim 
will need to appear at an adversarial hearing before a judge in order 
to obtain a full civil protection order, which may last for a year or 
more, depending on the state’s law.143 The general public often 
views civil protection orders with an unfair level of skepticism 
regarding their efficacy.144 However, research indicates that in many 
cases, civil protection orders stop abuse entirely or reduce frequency 
and severity of abuse.145 In addition, domestic violence victims 
generally view the value of civil protection orders positively.146 
 
(2001); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2018) (authorizing the court 
to enter a restraining order to grant ancillary relief and other relief including 
restitution, an order requiring the defendant to receive domestic violence 
counseling, and possession of personal property including a pet). 
 142 Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1506; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(b) 
(West 2017) (providing means to file a petition for a domestic violence restraining 
order in New Jersey court). 
 143 See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence
1/Charts/migrated_charts/2016%20CPO%20Availability%20Chart.pdf (listing 
domestic violence laws in all U.S. states and territories). 
 144 See, e.g., Robin L. Barton, Do Orders of Protection Actually Shield 
Domestic Violence Victims?, CRIME REPORT (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/23/do-orders-of-protection-actually-shield-
victims/ (providing examples of domestic violence victims who had protective 
orders against their abuser, who were ultimately killed); Stefanie Knowlton, Are 
Restraining Orders False Security?, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/07/domestic-violence-
deaths-raise-questions-about-gaps/15260841/ (last updated Sept. 7, 2014, 8:18 
PM). 
 145 Victoria L. Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent 
Police-Reported Violence, 288 JAMA 589, 589 (2002) (concluding “[p]ermanent, 
but not temporary, protection orders are associated with a significant decrease in 
risk of police-reported violence against women by their male intimate partners”). 
But see Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male 
Batterers After Two Years: Development of a Predictive Model, in DO ARRESTS 
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192, 207 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa 
eds., 1996) (noting “research does not reveal whether the use of [restraining 
orders] lessens the severity of continued abuse or the number of abuse incidents”). 
 146 Goldfarb, supra note 136, at 1510–12 (citing several studies in which 
seventy-two to eighty-four percent of women who had obtained civil protective 
orders reported improvements in their safety and well-being). 
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Any future Supreme Court decision on a constitutionally 
requisite mens rea for true threats will likely be in the context of a 
criminal case and, thus, will not automatically apply in civil 
protection order matters.147 However, even if the Supreme Court 
chose to explicitly limit a holding on the subjective test for true 
threats to criminal cases, the pronouncement would likely impact 
civil protection order matters because “criminal law casts a long 
shadow over civil protection order practice.”148 In order for a victim 
to receive a civil protection order based on threats, approximately 
eighteen states require her to prove the crime of threats.149 Victims 
in civil protection order cases alleging threats of violence that do not 
qualify as “terroristic threats” or “assault” under state law may, in 
some cases, argue that these threats constitute “stalking.”150 
 
 147 See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal 
Empowerment and Appeals Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici 
Curiae, supra note 21, at 31 (“Should the Court require proof of subjective intent 
in true threat prosecutions, Amici respectfully urge the Court to distinguish and 
carefully safeguard civil protection orders from its holding.”). 
 148 Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project 
and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 18, 27 (noting 
even in states not utilizing criminal statutes as controlling authority in civil 
protection order hearings, judges will be “inevitably influenced by” criminal law 
standards when evaluating abuse allegations); see also Ashley Hahn, Comment, 
Toward a Uniform Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order Law, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 897, 904 (2018) (noting that eleven states require a victim of 
domestic violence to prove all elements of one or more criminal offenses 
committed against her by the defendant to obtain a civil protection order, and 
twenty-one states require proof of a criminal act with respect to some types of 
abuse before a court will grant a civil protection order). 
 149 See Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals 
Project and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 27 (“In 
fact, approximately 18 states require litigants to prove the crime of threats in order 
to receive a civil protection order based on threats.”). 
 150 See James Thomas Tucker, Note, Stalking the Problems with Stalking 
Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609, 
615 (1993) (noting that anti-stalking statutes “filled the gap” left by state law 
definitions of terroristic threats and assault). A domestic violence victim unable 
to prove all elements of terroristic threats, assault, or stalking following an 
incident of abuse may also seek a civil protection order on the grounds of 
harassment. See generally, e.g., A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
STALKING/HARASSMENT CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2009) 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/ABA_Stalking-
HarassmentCivilProtectionOrdersByState_6-2009.pdf (listing the relevant 
statutes for each state and explaining what is needed to prove stalking versus 
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However, as with threats, some states require a victim to establish 
that the defendant committed the crime of stalking to receive a civil 
protection order on the ground of stalking.151 
A comprehensive examination of the potential impact of a 
Supreme Court decision on the constitutional mens rea requirement 
for true threats on state civil protection order relief would be 
challenging in light of the interplay between the civil protection 
order statutes and criminal law in many states, as well as the varied 
ways in which a threatening statement may qualify as an act of 
domestic violence.152 
However, a partial analysis of state civil protection order statutes 
suggests concerns on behalf of domestic violence victims with 
respect to their ability to obtain relief if the Court finds that the First 
Amendment requires a heightened mens rea for a true threat are 
warranted. While civil protection order statutes in some states 
currently rely on definitions of threats that require proof of a purpose 
to threaten, other jurisdictions provide relief for a domestic violence 
victims able to prove reckless disregard on the part of a former 
intimate partner who threatens violence against her.153 Many states 
have enacted civil protection order laws that define threats in a 
manner that focus on the objectively threatening nature of the 
statement to a reasonable person, rather than a speaker’s subjective 
 
harassment in each state, in order to obtain a civil protection order). However, 
harassment claims raise additional First Amendment issues beyond the scope of 
this Article. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment 
Orders, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 781 (2013). 
 151 See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 148, at 902, 904–05. 
 152 In addition, given the limited number of appeals in civil protection order 
cases, caselaw interpreting legislative intent on mens rea when the plain language 
of statute does not provide clear guidance on that element may not be available. 
 153 Compare FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2019) (indicating that to obtain an 
injunction for protection on basis of a threat, a victim may attempt to prove the 
crime of stalking, as defined by FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2019), which requires 
willful and malicious conduct, or the crime of assault, defined in FLA. STAT. 
§ 784.011 (2019), which requires an intentional threat), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:25-19 (West 2018) (offering a list of crimes that a petitioner may prove, such 
as terroristic threats under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-3 (West 2018), which requires 
either purpose to terrorize another or reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing 
another). See also Klein & Orloff, supra note 1, at 876 (noting “most statutes 
require threatening behavior and criminal intent on the part of the defendant,” 
while other statutes require “evidencing a continuity of purpose.”). 
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intent to threaten.154 Thus, if the Supreme Court requires a 
heightened mens rea—purpose or knowledge to threaten—in order 
to prove a true threat in the criminal context, it could “potentially     
[ ] undo[ ] years of legislative progress . . . to increase protections 
for victims of domestic violence” via civil protection orders.155 
Caselaw shows that First Amendment defenses have been raised 
frequently in domestic violence proceedings in recent years.156 A 
review of reported state court civil and criminal cases involving true 
threats and domestic violence indicates a surge in the number of 
litigants raising First Amendment arguments in these types of cases 
in the last twenty years.157 
 
 154 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(a)(3) (West 2016) (defining abuse which 
may enable a plaintiff to obtain a protective order to include acts which “place a 
person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that 
person or to another.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(1) (West 2017) (to obtain 
a protective order, a plaintiff must prove “family violence” such as “a threat that 
reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm”); see also Brief 
for Amicus Curiae National Center for Victims of Crime in Support of 
Respondent United States at 8–9, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) 
(No. 13-983) (noting most state stalking laws utilize an objective reasonable 
person standard and do not require defendant to have specific intent). 
 155 Soraya Chemaly & Mary Anne Franks, Supreme Court May Have Made 
Online Abuse Easier, TIME (June 3, 2015), https://time.com/3903908/supreme-
court-elonis-free-speech/. 
 156 See e.g., Williams v. Williams, 905 N.W.2d 900, 902, 904 (N.D. 2018) 
(reversing entry of restraining order obtained by wife against estranged husband 
and remanding for consideration of husband’s claim that entry of order based on 
his statements violated his First Amendment rights); Kreuzer v. Kreuzer, 761 
N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“Although Mr. Kreuzer’s picketing activities 
might qualify as protected speech in another place at another time, we do not think 
they qualify as protected speech on the facts of this case.”); Feinberg v. Butler, 
No. 25255, 2004 Haw. App. LEXIS 274, at *1, *18 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that an order prohibiting a defendant from “publish[ing] or mak[ing] public of 
[sic] any disparaging allegations against [the purported victim] that serve no 
legitimate purpose” violated the defendant’s First Amendment rights); Childs v. 
Ballou, 148 A.3d 291, 293, 298 (Me. 2016) (determining no error in a case 
prohibiting defendant from having any contact with his wife and using the First 
Amendment as “a sword to disrupt [the wife’s] life through behavior that . . . met 
the definitions of abuse”). 
 157 A Shepherd’s search for citations to Watts v. United States in state court 
cases referencing domestic violence (or related terms) indicates that in the first 40 
years following the decision (1970–1999), state courts cited Watts 91times, 
whereas in the last 20 years (2000–2019), state courts have cited Watts 209 times. 
2020] STRAIGHT OUTTA SCOTUS 745 
Media sources have paid recent attention to free speech issues in 
domestic violence proceedings, too.158 In addition, the Internet 
provides opportunities for domestic violence perpetrators to share 
litigation strategies and find legal information they may utilize in 
formulating a free speech defense in civil protection order 
proceedings.159 The Court should therefore anticipate that 
defendants in civil protection order cases will likely attempt to 
invoke any decision favoring increased protection of free speech in 
the context of true threats to oppose the issuance of orders against 
them. 
Finally, the Court should consider that the ability of domestic 
violence victims to obtain civil protection orders has implications 
for both victim safety and public safety because a civil protection 
order will generally prohibit the individual subject to the order from 
purchasing or possessing firearms.160 Numerous studies have 
established a strong connection between firearm access and 
domestic violence homicide.161 However, recognition of the link 
between domestic violence and mass shootings has come only in 
recent years, with research demonstrating that domestic violence 
 
Presumably, broader access to electronic legal research tools has played a part in 
this trend. 
 158 See, e.g., John S. Eory, Domestic Violence and Free Speech, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/domestic-violence-and-
free-speech; David Coursey, Judge: Apologize on Facebook or Go to Jail, 
FORBES (Feb. 26, 2012, 10:50 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidcoursey/2012/02/26/judge-apologize-on-
facebook-or-go-to-jail/#517482c335d9. 
 159 See, e.g., RESTRAINING ORDER BLOG, 
https://www.restrainingorderblog.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (blogging about 
retaliatory claims to civil protection order proceedings, use of subpoenas, and 
related litigation terminology); Should Restraining Orders Be Abolished as 
Incompatible with Free Speech Rights, QUORA, (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), 
https://www.quora.com/Should-restraining-orders-be-abolished-as-
incompatible-with-free-speech-rights. 
 160 GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 72–73. However, laws denying domestic 
violence perpetrators access to firearms not always enforced. Id. 
 161 Campbell et al., supra note 135, at 1092 (stating that the risk of homicide 
is five times greater for women whose current or former intimate partners have 
access to a gun); see also April Zeoli et al., Risks and Targeted Interventions: 
Firearms in Intimate Partner Violence, 38 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 125, 125 (2016) 
(noting that fifty percent of intimate partner homicide victims die as result of gun 
violence). 
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and family violence underlie more than half of the mass shootings 
perpetrated in the United States during the last decade.162 
In sum, any heightened mens rea requirement for true threats in 
civil cases has the potential to limit domestic violence victims’ 
access to protection orders, with negative consequences for both 
victim and public safety. 
C. Criminal Prosecution and Victim Interests and 
Perspectives 
Resolution of the First Amendment question left unanswered in 
Elonis will impact a broad range of criminal cases, including those 
involving domestic violence. Some commentators have expressed 
concern that true threat prosecutions pursuant to a low mens rea 
requirement may result in the conviction of individuals showing 
merely poor judgment, a result which criminal law disfavors.163 
Recent arrests and criminal charges, particularly those involving 
teenagers for statements on social media posts, suggest fears that the 
current approach is overly punitive may be warranted.164 The 
 
 162 Mass Shootings in the United States: 2009-2020, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN 
SAFETY https://everytownresearch.org/massshootingsreports/mass-shootings-in-
america-2009-2019/ (last updated Feb. 28, 2020). An analysis of mass shootings 
in the United States from 2009 to 2018 found 54% of mass shootings to be 
domestic violence or family violence related, defined by FBI as the murder of four 
or more people, not including the gunman, with one murder victim being a current 
or former intimate partner or family member of the shooter. Id. 
 163 See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and 
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 829, 875–76 
(2002) (“[A] purely negligence standard . . . is a potentially devastating legal 
sword to draw and wield”); Stephanie Charlin, Comment, Clicking the “Like” 
Button for Recklessness: How Elonis v. United States Changed True Threats 
Analysis, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 705, 720 (2016) (“[N]egligence [is] insufficient 
because it [is] ‘inconsistent with ‘the conventional requirement for criminal 
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing . . . .’”) (quoting Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 
2011). 
 164 Justin Jouvenal, A 12-Year-Old Girl Is Facing Criminal Charges for Using 
Certain Emoji. She’s Not Alone., WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2016, 3:47 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/02/27/a-12-year-old-girl-
is-facing-criminal-charges-for-using-emoji-shes-not-
alone/?utm_term=.a063bb86c329; Austin Sanders, Felony Charges Dropped in 
“Facebook Threat” Case, AUSTIN CHRONICLES (Apr. 6, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2018-04-06/felony-charges-
dropped-in-facebook-threat-case/; Student Accused of Making Online Threats 
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significant consequences for uttering a true threat make it desirable 
to avoid wrongful convictions in this area of the law.165 In theory, 
problems with true threat statutes being overly punitive could be 
addressed, in part, through adjustments in criminal penalties.166 
However, significant changes in statutory and common law 
standards for threats seem unlikely, and thus, the Court should 
establish the constitutional requirements for true threats in light of 
current law. 
When specifically considering domestic violence cases, victims 
have a wide variety of opinions regarding prosecution of their 
current or former intimate partners for alleged threats against them, 
ranging from enthusiastic to ambivalent to opposed.167 Even after 
separating, domestic violence victims may have many reasons for 
 
Directed at Emmerich Manual High School Arrested, CBS 4, 
https://cbs4indy.com/2017/01/13/juvenile-accused-of-making-online-threats-
directed-at-emerich-manual-high-school-arrested/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2017, 
4:40 PM); Thomas Tracy, Winking Smiley Face: Brooklyn Teen Boy’s Emoji Cop 
Threat Charges Tossed by Grand Jury, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 03, 2015, 12:52 
PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/grand-jury-tosses-
brooklyn-teen-emoji-threat-charges-article-1.2101735 (arguing that concern for 
excessive criminalization of online speech should be addressed by reconsidering 
the minimum age for criminal responsibility in some jurisdictions and 
prosecutorial discretion); see also Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 853 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), denying cert. (expressing concern that a defendant 
convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison may have merely made a 
drunken joke). 
 165 For example, in Elonis all five charged counts of threats were felonies. 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007–08 (2015); see also Knox Writ of 
Cert., supra note 24, at 21 (noting that defendants incarcerated following 
convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) “faced an average prison term of 
more than two years.”). 
 166 See Randall Eliason, The Rush to Criminal Remedies, SIDEBARS (Sept. 24, 
2019) https://sidebarsblog.com/when-criminal-remedies-prosecution-
appropriate/ (discussing alternatives to criminal sanctions and arguing that 
criminal remedies are being used too often). 
 167 See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s 
Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1888 (2002) 
(commenting favorably on pro-arrest and pro-prosecution policies which build in 
greater flexibility for a victim’s ambivalence “recognizing the complexity of her 
situation”); Sara C. Hare, What Do Battered Women Want? Victims’ Opinions on 
Prosecution, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 611, 612 (2006) (noting that many victims 
who do initially contact law enforcement and request filing of criminal charges 
later change their minds and seek to “drop charges”). 
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not wishing to see their partners prosecuted, including the need for 
child support or the desire to ensure children have visitation with 
their fathers.168 Despite this range of viewpoints among victims, the 
victims’ advocacy movement in the United States has historically 
focused on criminal law responses to combating domestic 
violence.169 Meanwhile, some scholars have proposed alternative 
approaches, including restorative justice, to address domestic 
violence.170 In recent years, more advocates have joined in the 
longstanding calls for policy makers to rethink the centrality of 
criminalization in the response to domestic violence.171 Thus, it is 
undisputed that true threat rules which facilitate high rates of 
prosecution for domestic violence would conflict with the goals, and 
undermine the autonomy of, at least some victims.172 
Domestic violence victims’ interests can also include robust 
protections for public dissent. Rhetorical threats of violence can 
serve to express outrage on topics of public concern and draw 
attention to dissenting political viewpoints but can only do so if the 
First Amendment offers strong protection for such speech from 
government suppression.173 The battered women’s movement began 
 
 168 Niwako Yamawaki et al., Perceptions of Domestic Violence: The Effects 
of Domestic Violence Myths, Victim’s Relationship With Her Abuser, and the 
Decision to Return to Her Abuser, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3195, 3196–
97 (2012). 
 169 Mimi E. Kim, The Coupling and Decoupling of Safety and Crime Control, 
in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY 15, 15 (Jane K. Stoever ed., 2019); see also 
Erika Sussman, Reflections on Police Violence and the Implications for Survivors, 
CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUSTICE (July 13, 2016), 
https://csaj.org/news/view/we-are-reeling-after-last-week (explaining that in the 
1970s, advocates for battered women sought to address the harm of domestic 
violence through “criminal justice remedies, in part to ensure public recognition 
of these crimes against women.”). 
 170 See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal 
the Violence of Crime, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 473 (2006); see also Laurie S. 
Kohn, What’s So Funny about Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative 
Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 517, 522–23 (2010). 
 171 Kim, supra note 169, at 31–32. 
 172 See Yamawaki et al., supra note 168, at 3198. 
 173 See, e.g., Sam Sanders, Kathy Griffin: Life After the Trump Severed Head 
Controversy, NPR (April 23, 2019, 5:09 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/716258113/kathy-griffin-life-after-the-trump-
severed-head-controversy. In 2017, comedian Kathy Griffin lost work 
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as a protest movement against societal norms which tolerated 
domestic violence.174 Today, victim advocates and scholars 
continue to seek changes in domestic violence policy, some of 
which are controversial.175 Moreover, the intersectional identities of 
many domestic violence victims suggests that those advocating on 
their behalf should seek change on a broad range of societal issues 
beyond intimate partner abuse.176 Domestic violence victims are 
disproportionately women from marginalized groups, such as 
women of color, immigrants, and LGBTQ individuals.177 A 
correlation exists between domestic violence and poverty, as well.178 
As a result, effective domestic violence victim advocacy requires 
 
immediately after she posed with a mock-severed head of President Trump and 
was placed on the “no-fly” list for two months. Id. “Federal officials also 
threatened to charge [Griffin] with conspiracy to assassinate the president.” Id. 
 174 See Kim, supra note 169, at 17–18. 
 175 See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 34, at 8. 
 176 See id. at 8–9 (discussing the intersectionality between domestic violence 
issues, over-criminalization, and mass incarceration). 
 177 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: FACTS AND STATES 
COLLECTION, WOMEN OF COLOR NETWORK 2–4, 6 (2006) 
https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/women_of_color_network_facts_domestic_violence_2
006.pdf (highlighting specific domestic violence issues that affect different 
women of color); MIKEL L. WALTERS ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON VICTIMIZATION BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1, 18–23 
(2013) https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf 
(studying prevalence of domestic violence behaviors among LGBT individuals in 
the United States); SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER 
EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 198 (2016), 
http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%20Rep
ort%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf (showing that of the transgender and non-
binary individuals surveyed, “[m]ore than half (54%) experienced some form of 
intimate partner violence, including acts involving coercive control and physical 
harm.”); The Facts on Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, FUTURES 
WITHOUT VIOLENCE 
https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Children_and_Families/Im
migrant.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (finding that immigrant women often 
experience higher rates of domestic violence than U.S. citizens due to more 
limited access to legal and social services as well as cultural influences for some 
victims). 
 178 See generally JILL DAVIES, POLICY BLUEPRINT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND POVERTY 4 (2002), 
https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/BCS15_BP.pdf. 
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work on an array of social justice issues which can impact victims 
both directly and indirectly by effecting victims’ families, friends, 
and communities (e.g., minimum wage rates, immigration policy, 
and police misconduct).179 Mass incarceration represents one such 
issue and has had a devastating impact on many of the communities 
in which domestic violence victims live and work.180 A low mens 
rea for true threats in criminal prosecutions would not only chill 
public protest speech, but could also contribute to mass 
incarceration, thereby harming the interests of many domestic 
violence victims.181 
Consideration of the foregoing issues highlights the 
complexities of formulating an approach to true threat jurisprudence 
that reflects to the greatest possible degree the preferences and 
interests of all domestic violence victims in both criminal and civil 
cases. In turning to other categories of unprotected speech, 
defamation jurisprudence provides support for a nuanced, multi-
tiered approach to the subjective test for true threats which attempts 
to optimally promote the goals and needs of domestic violence 
victims while also respecting free speech principles. 
III. DEFAMATION OFFERS GUIDANCE ON TRUE THREATS 
While the Supreme Court has noted that unprotected speech 
categories “can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
regulated,” it has also remarked that these classes of speech are not 
 
 179 See generally, e.g., LAURA HUIZAR & TSEDEYE GEBRESELASSIE, NAT’L 
EMP’T L. PROJECT, WHAT A $15 MINIMUM WAGE MEANS FOR WOMEN AND 
WORKERS OF COLOR (2016), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Policy-
Brief-15-Minimum-Wage-Women-Workers-of-Color.pdf; Michelle S. Jacobs, 
The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police Violence, 24 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39 (2017); Edna Erez et al., Intersections of 
Immigration and Domestic Violence: Voices of Battered Immigrant Women, 4 
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 32 (2009). 
 180 Campbell Robertson, Crime is Down, Yet U.S. Incarceration Rates are Still 
Among the Highest in the World, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/us-mass-incarceration-rate.html 
(stating that African American men are serving prison sentences at almost six 
times the rate of white men and African American women are incarcerated at a 
rate double that of White women). 
 181 See, e.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 163, at 875–76; Charlin, supra note 
163, at 720. 
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“entirely invisible to the Constitution . . . .”182 The Court has 
established definitive legal standards to delineate when speech falls 
outside the realm of constitutional protection with respect to some 
categories of unprotected speech, but not in regard to others.183 To 
the extent that the Supreme Court has announced them, the 
constitutional requirements for other categories of unprotected 
speech vary, but all reflect the need to balance the potential value of 
speech with the injuries speech may cause.184 Since the Supreme 
Court has only substantively analyzed the issue of true threats in 
Watts and Black, with neither case offering a comprehensive 
definition of the term or a rule setting the constitutional boundaries 
for threatening speech,185 some scholars have argued that true 
threats need their own “fine-tuned test and definition.”186 
Other categories of unprotected speech with more robust 
definitions and rules, in particular defamation,187 and, to a lesser 
extent, incitement,188 may inform future analysis of true threats. 
Incitement provides guidance specifically on the optimal rules for 
true threats uttered in the public protest context.189 The Court 
established the modern rule on incitement in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
in which it determined that the government could not prohibit 
speech advocating unlawful violence or other illegal acts unless that 
speech was directed to inciting imminent lawless action and likely 
 
 182 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). 
 183 See Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech—And 
the Protracted Failure to Delimit the True Treats Exception to the First 
Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“contrasting the [Supreme] Court’s 
protracted failure to define and delimit true threats with the comparatively robust 
guidance it has offered with other [unprotected speech] discrete categories.”). 
 184 See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content 
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. J. 647, 650–52 (2002) (describing tension between need to protect against 
serious injury from speech and need to avoid censorship); see also Erica 
Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 689 (2016) 
(defining idea of “free speech consequentialism,” where the harms and benefits 
of speech are weighed to determine what kinds of speech are constitutionally 
protected). 
 185 See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 186 See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 183, at 53. 
 187 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 188 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 189 See id. 
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to produce that action.190 Advocacy falling short of incitement 
deserves First Amendment protection because “the mere abstract 
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a 
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for 
violent action.”191 To date, each of the Supreme Court’s cases 
addressing incitement has involved public speech intended to 
achieve political and social policy goals.192 Some lower courts have 
read Brandenburg to require a determination of a specific intent 
(purpose) on the part of the speaker to incite immediate unlawful 
action before finding speech to be unprotected by the 
Constitution,193 but the Supreme Court has not yet confirmed this to 
be the correct standard. The Brandenburg Court’s reasoning 
suggests that the First Amendment provides protection for some 
speech regarding the commission of violent acts for the sake of 
promoting discussion on issues of public concern through a 
heightened mens rea requirement. As a result, such reasoning could 
potentially provide support for utilizing a similar approach with 
respect to true threats in the public protest context. 
However, with respect to true threats against a private individual 
or against any individual uttered in a private setting, even a public 
official or figure, incitement does not offer a useful analogy. Private 
context threats do not advance the goal of robust public debate that 
seems to serve as the primary rationale for requiring specific intent 
for regulation of incitement.194 Moreover, an examination of 
 
 190 Id. at 448–49. 
 191 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)). 
 192 See, e.g., id. at 447 (addressing speech at Ku Klux Klan rally in support of 
white supremacy); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) 
(discussing civil rights protest speech in support of boycott against racial 
discrimination by local businesses); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1, 44 (2010) (finding that the giving of aid, including training in peaceful 
conflict resolution and political advocacy on behalf of foreign organizations, may 
be deemed unlawful assistance of terrorists by the U.S. government). 
 193 See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 
1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, advocacy may be punished only if it is ‘directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.’ The Government must establish a ‘knowing affiliation’ and a 
‘specific intent to further those illegal aims.’”) (internal citations omitted).  
 194 Cf. Batchis, supra note 183, at 51 (“If the public figure is also a public 
official with political duties, it may be even more likely that punishing such 
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Supreme Court cases on incitement suggests incitement differs from 
true threats in several key respects. First, incitement covers a 
broader range of activity (i.e., non-violent law breaking) than true 
threats and thus this category of speech may merit greater 
constitutional protection.195 Second, incitement involves a more 
diverse group of potential targets including government institutions 
and private companies, in addition to the possible targets of true 
threats, namely individuals and groups of individuals.196 This 
distinction similarly supports the argument that the Supreme Court 
may find the First Amendment to be less concerned with 
government regulation of true threats which, by definition, involve 
potential physical injury or death to human beings versus 
incitement, which may only seek to cause property damage. Finally, 
incitement requires a third party hearing the speech to decide to act 
in violation of the law to cause injury, whereas the harm from true 
threats does not require action by a third party; it requires only that 
the target be aware of the threat.197 As a result, true threats will 
generally be more likely to cause fear and disruption to individuals 
in comparison to incitement. In sum, the Supreme Court’s 
incitement jurisprudence lends support to an approach to true threats 
that requires a specific intent (purpose or knowledge) in the public 
protest context to promote self-government, but these incitement 
cases do not offer similar insight into the appropriate standard for 
private context threats. 
 
threats will, in some sense, stifle public debate and discussion about important 
issues.”). 
 195 See id. at 36–37 (discussing how the Court defined incitement language 
broadly and narrowed the definition of true threats by saying that intimidation is 
not part of the definition of true threats). 
 196 See, e.g., Edward Helmore, ‘How is This Not Inciting Violence?’: Gun 
Shop Billboard Targets the Squad, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/01/gun-shop-billboard-the-
squad-aoc-omar-tlaib-pressley (discussing billboard created by a group of 
individuals targeting government officials, as possibility being considered 
incitement). 
 197 Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1968) (holding that a 
speaker who prepares a group for violent action and steels the group to such 
action has committed unlawful incitement), with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
359 (2003) (holding that a true threat is a “statement where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual”) (emphasis added). 
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The legal standards for defamation offer more extensive 
guidance in answering the mens rea question left open in Elonis for 
several reasons relating to similarities between defamation and true 
threats.198 With both defamation and true threats, the Court seeks to 
balance protecting First Amendment rights, especially robust debate 
on political issues, with deterring and remedying harm to individuals 
caused by speech violating common law norms.199 Threats of 
violence and defamatory lies both have the ability to “severely 
disrupt peoples’ lives, both by affecting them emotionally . . . and 
by impairing their social ties, their professional activities, and their 
ability to earn a living.”200 In addition, defamation and true threats 
both cause injury as soon as the victim learns of the speech.201 True 
threats generally cause the target to experience immediate 
 
 198 It has been suggested in at least one scholarly article that rules regarding 
obscenity may offer the Supreme Court a useful analogy for true threats because 
both true threats and obscenity cause individual and social harm immediately 
upon exposure to relevant speech. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2014 Term— 
Leading Case: Federal Statutes and Regulations: Federal Threats Statute – Mens 
Rea and the First Amendment – Elonis v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331, 
338 (2015). However, the comparison is a weak one, in part because the narrow 
definition for true threats contrasts sharply with the notoriously ambiguous 
definition of obscenity. Compare Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 
(2015) (“To qualify as a true threat, a communication must be a serious expression 
of an intention to commit unlawful physical violence, not merely ‘political 
hyperbole’; ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’; or 
‘vituperative, abusive, and inexact’ statements.”), with Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding that for something to be deemed obscene, “the trier of 
fact must [find]: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 199 See e.g., Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave?, supra note 117, at 21 n.78 
(describing how different courts have balanced First Amendment rights against 
state interests in different contexts). 
 200 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 201 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1964) (noting that 
common law presumed general damages for defamation). In contrast to true 
threats, defamation also causes damage immediately upon publication, assuming 
those hearing the defamatory speech find it credible and that their opinion(s) 
impact the target. See id. 
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“apprehension and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves 
bluster or not,” just as defamation often inflicts demonstrable 
reputational injury despite falsity.202 Finally, allegations of both 
defamation and true threats may arise in the context of speech on 
matters of public concern. Matters of public concern have been 
variously defined by the Supreme Court as “subject[s] of legitimate 
news interest . . . of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public”203 as well as speech “fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”204 
Defamation jurisprudence specifically provides an analytical 
framework differentiating between public officials and public 
figures versus private individuals, an approach that may also be 
useful with true threats.205 At common law, defamation required 
proof of negligent publication of a false statement of fact that was 
damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation and received no constitutional 
protection.206 However, since the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have tended to modestly increase constitutional protection 
for defamation in particular settings.207 In New York Times v. 
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official could not 
recover civil damages for defamation relating to official conduct 
unless he proved “actual malice” on the part of the speaker by clear 
 
 202 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1004 
n.3, 1107 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 203 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (quoting City of San Diego v. 
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam)). 
 204 Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
 205 In the First Amendment context, the term “public official” has been utilized 
to cover a broad range of government employees. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (“[T]he ‘public official’ designation applies at the 
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or 
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the 
conduct of governmental affairs.”). The Supreme Court has likewise established 
parameters for qualification of a person as a “public figure.” See, e.g., Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining “public figures” to include 
individuals who attain status by occupying roles of special prominence in the 
affairs of society or thrusting themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies). 
 206 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc., v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 39 
F.3d 191, 195 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 207 See, e.g., Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 931 (Ala. 1992) (Maddox, J., 
dissenting). 
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and convincing evidence.208 The Court defined “actual malice” in 
this context as knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement 
or reckless disregard of its falsity.209 Similarly, in Garrison v. 
Louisiana, the Court decided that the First Amendment prohibited 
the imposition of criminal libel sanctions for criticism of public 
officials in the conduct of their duties in the absence of actual 
malice.210 
In reaching these decisions, the Court emphasized that “speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.”211 Continuation of the common law 
negligence rule in this context would have the negative consequence 
of self-censorship.212 The Court acknowledged that an “erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected 
if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that 
they ‘need . . . to survive.’”213 In addition, the Court justified a 
heightened mens rea for speech defaming public officials because it 
concluded that government employees had, in essence, assumed the 
risk of defamation, stating that “public men, are, as it were, public 
property.”214 
In contrast, the Court refused to extend the New York Times v. 
Sullivan actual malice standard to defamatory statements regarding 
a private individual, even on a matter of public concern, in Gertz v. 
Welch.215 As in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court in Gertz again 
justified differential legal treatment of public officials versus private 
individuals based on the expectations of those assuming a public 
role.216 Specifically, the Court explained the “assumption that public 
 
 208 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 209 Id. 
 210 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1964). Three years later, the 
Supreme Court held in another case that the New York Times rule applied to public 
figures, as well as public officials. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 
(1967). 
 211 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75. 
 212 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279. 
 213 Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 214 Id. at 268 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263–64 (1952)). 
 215 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
 216 Id. at 345. The Court also referenced the fact that government officials have 
greater access to public channels of communication and thus may more effectively 
use counter-speech to remedy reputational harm caused by defamation. Id. at 344–
46. 
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officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to 
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning 
them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual.”217 
At least one jurist has previously suggested the Supreme Court’s 
approach to defamation provides useful guidance for true threat 
jurisprudence.218 In her dissent in Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 
Judge Marsha S. Berzon recommended courts look to the Supreme 
Court’s defamation jurisprudence with its varied levels of 
constitutional speech protection “depending upon the nature of the 
speech in question and the role of speech of that nature in the scheme 
of the First Amendment” as a model for true threats.219 Thus, 
development of defamation jurisprudence from common law rules 
allowing negligence standards to a requirement of actual malice in 
the context of a public official or public figure for liability may 
preview a parallel development in regard to true threats. 
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and 
consideration of the concerns of domestic violence victims suggest 
that drawing upon the Court’s approaches to defamation and 
incitement to create a three-tiered approach for the requisite mens 
rea of true threats will best deter threats of violence while also 
protecting free speech rights, particularly in the context of public 
protest. In determining that a statement qualifies as a true threat and 
thus lacks constitutional protection, the Supreme Court should 
require that lower courts always first utilize the objective test, which 
necessitates a finding that a reasonable person would consider the 
speech in question to be a serious threat to commit an act of violence 
 
 217 Id. at 345. 
 218 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Berzon, J., 
dissenting). 
 219 Id. at 1104–05 (acknowledging the targeted medical professionals were not 
public officials but found the “public nature of the presentation and content 
addressing a public issue . . . critical.”). 
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against a specific individual or group of individuals.220 Then, for 
threats meeting the objective test,221 a further subjective test should 
apply: courts should assess the speaker’s mens rea to determine if 
criminal or civil liability attaches according to a three-tiered 
approach. First, in cases of public protest context threats, the 
Constitution should be understood to require the purpose to 
threaten, or knowledge to a substantial certainty, that the statement 
would be understood by a reasonable person to be a true threat, for 
criminal or civil liability.222 Second, in criminal prosecutions for 
private context threats, on the question of any intent to threaten, a 
mens rea of recklessness should be deemed sufficient for conviction 
pursuant to the First Amendment.223 Third, in cases in which any 
individual seeks civil legal relief in response to a private context 
threat, a general intent to communicate a statement qualifying 
objectively as a true threat should be adequate, from a constitutional 
perspective, to permit entry of a judgment against the speaker. 
A. Specific Intent for Public Protest Context Threats 
In several ways, Supreme Court free speech precedent suggests 
that the Constitution should be interpreted as requiring purpose or 
knowledge on the part of a speaker who makes a true threat against 
a public official or figure as part of a public protest for liability. First, 
the Court has repeatedly and emphatically acknowledged the high 
value placed by the Constitution on core political speech.224 A low 
mens rea for true threat liability will be more likely to chill public, 
politically motivated, rhetorical threats of violence than other types 
of true threats. Second, the Court’s caselaw establishes that 
 
 220 As discussed in the Introduction, supra, in some jurisdictions, the objective 
test focuses on the perspective of a reasonable speaker or a reasonable 
listener/recipient rather than a reasonable person. This Article takes no position 
on which of these variations of the objective test reflects the proper constitutional 
approach and uses reasonable person here for convenience and because it arguably 
encompasses both perspectives. 
 221 See supra Section I.A. 
 222 As discussed in the Introduction, supra, public protest context threats is a 
term used by the author to define threats against public officials or figures in a 
public forum and on topics of public concern. 
 223 As discussed in the Introduction, supra, private context threats are threats 
against private individuals or against public officials or figures outside of a public 
protest context. 
 224 See supra Part III; infra Section IV.A.1. 
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government officials and public figures assume the risk of harsh 
public speech against themselves.225 Finally, an examination of the 
respective harms caused by true threats against public officials and 
figures versus true threats against private individuals indicates that 
threats against the latter will generally cause greater injury.226 
1. HIGH VALUE OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC PROTEST CONTEXT 
As the Court has stated, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment 
is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of 
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”227 In 
the United States, we often discuss issues of public concern through 
the lens of the person responsible for executing policy on those 
issues.228 Reflecting this tendency, a significant number of true 
threat prosecutions have involved public criticism of government 
officials in which defendants argued their threats served merely as a 
rhetorical device to protest the target official’s policy positions.229 
In public debates over highly contentious issues, “speakers will 
often resort to the language of threats and intimidation to 
communicate the depth of [their] feelings about the topic under 
discussion.”230 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
United States’ commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues 
may result in “vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”231 By going “beyond 
 
 225 See supra Part III and infra Section IV.A.3. 
 226 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974); infra Section 
IV.B. 
 227 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
 228 Batchis, supra note 183 at 51. 
 229 See, e.g., Hillstrom v. United States, 760 F. App’x 836, 837 (11th Cir. 
2019) (defendant argued he lacked mens rea for a threat conviction based on blog 
entry stating “by the end of this year a rouque [sic] [assistant state’s attorney] will 
be executed for his abuse of prosecutorial power” and then naming the specific 
attorney who would be “first”); see also Batchis, supra note 183, at 51. 
 230 Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and 
Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1348 (2005). 
 231 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)); 
see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“Strong 
and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet 
phrases.”); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (noting 
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the bounds of good taste and conventional manners,”232 speech may 
provoke an emotional impact that better enables the speaker to 
successfully convey a political message. 
Historically, recognition of the special value of political speech 
lead the Court to pronounce a higher mens rea requirement for 
liability for defamation of a public official than the mens rea that is 
required to defame a private individual.233 For similar reasons, 
public threats of violence against public officials may hold value on 
matters of public concern, and thus, may merit additional 
constitutional protection that is not warranted in the context of a 
privately communicated threat.234 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Virginia v. Black, provides support for the proposed distinction 
between threats in a public protest context versus a private 
context.235 Specifically, the Black plurality found that the state 
statute at issue was unconstitutional because it failed to differentiate 
between cross burning as a form of expression for purposes of 
conveying political views, which could be protected speech, versus 
cross burning for purposes of intimidation, which would qualify as 
a true threat and thus be unprotected speech.236 
One potential objection to the proposed heightened mens rea for 
public protest context threats relates to the fact that the lines of 
demarcation between issues of public concern and those of merely 
private concern have not been firmly established in the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.237 Thus, the proposed use 
of a high mens rea (i.e., purpose or knowledge), for public protest 
context threats will likely, in practice, present similar challenges in 
determining whether a particular statement involves an issue of 
public concern. However, the Supreme Court has recently addressed 
 
that society has a right to criticize public officials even if one “speak[s] foolishly 
and without moderation”). 
 232 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 54. 
 233 See supra Section III. 
 234 See Batchis, supra note 183 at 51. 
 235 See supra Section I.A. 
 236 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365–66 (2003) (plurality opinion); see 
also supra Section I.A. 
 237 See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 655, 725–26 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “line 
drawing efforts in [matters of public concern versus matters of private concern] 
have not been reassuring”). 
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the distinction between public speech versus private speech and 
provided some additional guidance in this area.238 Moreover, lower 
courts frequently adjudicate First Amendment cases involving these 
distinctions,239 suggesting that the proposed approach to true threats 
will be workable. 
2. GREATER SUSCEPTIBILITY OF PUBLIC PROTEST SPEECH TO 
CHILLING 
A minimal mens rea for true threats will likely chill some 
political protests that utilize rhetorical threats, via art or otherwise, 
whereas it will not likely deter speakers acting with poor judgment. 
Defenses to true threat prosecutions based specifically on the 
requisite mens rea required by the First Amendment, as opposed to 
challenges based on the objective test, tend to manifest in one of 
several forms. Some defendants in such actions assert that they were 
merely upset and venting frustration, or that they were simply 
joking.240 Others argue that the threat constitutes part of a work of 
art such as a story, picture, or lyric, and that the Constitution protects 
their freedom of expression because they intended to create art and 
not to actually threaten anyone.241 Finally, some defend true threat 
 
 238 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2016) (presenting the 
issue of the case as whether the speech at issue was of public or private concern 
and offering some guiding principles for the public concern test); United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012) (plurality opinion) (differentiating between 
fraudulent speech to government employees on official matters, as well as false 
representations that one speaks on behalf of the government, and fraudulent 
communications in other contexts not implicating such concerns). 
 239 See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 684–86 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (applying the Snyder public versus private speech distinction to speech 
at a funeral or burial site); Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 611–12 (6th Cir. 
2018) (analyzing whether Trump’s direction to have his supporters remove 
protestors violated public protest rights under Snyder). 
 240 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ark. 2002) (noting defendant 
told purported victim “[d]on’t take this serious” at the time of making the 
purported threat). 
 241 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1168 (Pa. 2018) 
(concerning songs); Commonwealth v. Grenga, No. WOCR201401337, 33 Mass. 
L. Rep. 94, 95 (Mass. Supp. 2015) (concerning a chalkboard drawing); In re 
George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Cal. 2004) (concerning poetry). 
762 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:711 
prosecutions on the grounds that their threats were rhetorical as part 
of a political protest.242 
A low mens rea requirement for true threats will be less likely 
to chill the speech of those who threaten violence when upset or due 
to a miscalculation on what qualifies as funny than it will be to 
suppress the speech of political protestors, including artists. While 
many protestors extemporize in public speeches, they generally 
attempt to articulate their points in a strategic manner to better 
achieve their goals. Similarly, artists tend to labor thoughtfully over 
their work and, even when creating art quickly or spontaneously, 
generally give careful consideration to the distribution of their 
work.243 In contrast, irate individuals and ill-advised jokesters do not 
generally consider legal consequences.244  
Rhetorical threats in the political protest context may also be 
more likely to garner the attention of government speech 
suppression efforts than threats against private individuals.245 Rap 
music provides a valuable lens through which to consider the 
chilling effect of a low mens rea standard for true threats on public 
protest, since rap musicians have frequently stood at the crossroads 
of political dissent in pop culture and true threat prosecutions in 
recent years.246 With respect to threats of violence in rap lyrics, some 
 
 242 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902, 928 
(1982) (finding the statement “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist 
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck” as an “impassioned plea for black 
citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and 
economic power available to them”); Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 827, 832 
(9th Cir. 2008) (painting messages such as “I AM A FUCKING SUICIDE 
BOMBER COMMUNIST TERRORIST!” and “ALLAH PRAISE THE 
PATRIOT ACT . . . FUCKING JIHAD ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT! P.S. 
W.O.M.D. ON BOARD!” as a “protest against government policy”). 
 243 See In re George T., 93 P.3d at 1011 (explaining how the defendant 
carefully “labeled [his poems] ‘dark poetry’ to inform readers that they were 
exactly that”). 
 244 See generally, e.g., People v. Eure, 488 N.E.2d 1267, 1271–72, (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986) (explaining that a defendant who acts in the heat of passion, anger, or 
fear does not think when they act and cannot be deterred by legal consequences, 
such as an armed violence enhancement). 
 245 See Hustler Magazine, Inc., et. al. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51–52 (1988). 
 246 See, e.g., People v. Murillo, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) 
(reversing trial court’s dismissal of felony threat complaint on grounds that rap 
lyrics were protected speech and could not be basis for a conviction where lyrics 
lamented a friend’s incarceration and called the friend’s accusers “snitches” and 
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threats serve in efforts to convey a broader message advocating for 
political or social change.247 In other instances, threats of violence 
by rap artists seem to function primarily as a means of self-
expression and/or to garner public attention for commercial 
purposes.248 Finally, some rap lyrics threatening violence seem 
primarily designed to provoke fear in the target(s) with the artistic 
medium of rap perhaps selected, as in the Elonis case,249 to provide 
a potential free speech defense in the event of litigation.250 
Rap artists have faced arrest, prosecution, and other types of less 
formal governmental pressure in response to their use of threats in 
songs, including those critical of public officials.251 Perhaps the 
 
threatened to kill them); Lynn Neary, Op-Ed: Two-Year Sentence For Rapper 
‘Excessive,’ NPR (Aug. 10, 2009, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111742102. 
 247 See, e.g., PUBLIC ENEMY, By the Time I Get to Arizona, on APOCALYPSE 
91 . . . THE ENEMY STRIKES BLACK (Def Jam Records & Columbia Records 1991) 
(rap song ostensibly threatening to kill Arizona’s then Governor Evan Mecham in 
response to his cancellation of the state’s holiday honoring Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., with lyrics including “I’m on the one mission to get a politician to honor 
/ Or he’s a goner by the time I get to Arizona” and a video depicting violence 
against fictional politicians); BODY COUNT, Cop Killer, on BODY COUNT (Sire 
Records 1992) (“I’m cop killer, it’s better you than me / Cop killer, fuck police 
brutality!”); see also Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the 
Protection of Free Expression et al. in Support of the Petition for A Writ Of 
Certiorari at 8, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) 
(explaining how rap evolved with political overtones, as a means through which 
people could comment on and challenge the social conditions). 
 248 See, e.g., EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Aftermath 
Entertainment & Interscope Records 2000) (“Baby you’re so precious, daddy’s so 
proud of you / Sit down bitch! You move again I’ll beat the shit out of you! 
(Okay).”). In light of the lack of criminal charges or public comment by Eminem’s 
former wife Kimberly Ann Scott regarding his numerous songs threatening her 
with violence, it seems likely she viewed the songs not as true threats but perhaps 
as profit motivated revenge fantasies or, in some instances, descriptions of prior 
abuse. 
 249 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–07 (2015). 
 250 See, e.g., Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592, 595 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) 
(using rap video on YouTube to threaten a former intimate partner with death). 
 251 Adam Liptak, Hip-Hop Artists Give the Supreme Court a Primer on Rap 
Music, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-rap-music.html; 
Veronica Stracqualursi, Killer Mike, Chance the Rapper, Meek Mill to Supreme 
Court: Pittsburgh Rapper’s Lyrics Are Not ‘A True Threat of Violence,’ CNN, 
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most famous example involves the rap group N.W.A., which 
released the song Fuck tha Police in 1988 with lyrics condemning 
police brutality against African-Americans and referencing violent 
retaliation in what one group member described as a “revenge 
fantasy.”252 The Assistant Director of the FBI wrote a letter on 
behalf of the Bureau to the president of N.W.A.’s record label 
objecting to the song, which he claimed encouraged violence against 
police officers.253 In addition, “[a]n informal police network faxe[d] 
messages to police stations nationwide, urging officers to help 
cancel concerts.”254 These government and quasi-government 
actions aimed at suppressing dissent achieved partial success in that 
N.W.A.’s promoter insisted that the group not play Fuck tha Police 
on tour although, ultimately, Fuck tha Police, along with the album 




rappers/index.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2019, 5:53 PM). 
 252 Kelley L. Carter, The Painful, Long, and Lasting Legacy of “Fuck tha 
Police,” BUZZFEED (Aug. 13, 2015, 6:06 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kelleylcarter/how-fuck-tha-police-
started-a-revolution. N.W.A. is an abbreviation for “Niggaz Wit Attitudes.” 
Danielle Harling, Ice Cube Names “Things N.W.A. Does Not Stand For” With 
Jimmy Fallon, HIPHOPDX (AUG. 6, 2015, 7:30 AM), 
https://hiphopdx.com/news/id.34972/title.ice-cube-names-things-n-w-a-does-
not-stand-for-with-jimmy-fallon. 
 253 When Christian America and the Cops Went Insane Over N.W.A, Rap, and 
Metal, VILLAGE VOICE (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2015/08/20/when-christian-america-and-the-
cops-went-insane-over-n-w-a-rap-and-metal/. 
 254 Id. These efforts to inspire cancellation of N.W.A. concerts would likely 
have succeeded in several cities but for interventions by prominent public figures. 
In addition, both on- and off-duty police in cities around the United States refused 
to act as security when the group went on tour. See Kory Grow, N.W.A’s ‘Straight 
Outta Compton’: 12 Things You Didn’t Know, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 8, 2018, 
8:46 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/n-w-as-straight-
outta-compton-12-things-you-didnt-know-707207/. 
 255 Amy Nicholson, 9 Truths Cut From Straight Outta Compton, L.A. 
WEEKLY (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.laweekly.com/9-truths-cut-from-straight-
outta-compton/ (highlighting N.W.A. member, Ice Cube’s, statement that the 
group’s promoter conditioned its 1988 concert tour on their not performing Fuck 
tha Police). N.W.A. was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 2016 
and, later that year, their album Straight Outta Compton was inducted into the 
Grammy Hall of Fame after it went triple platinum. Peter A. Berry, N.W.A.’s 
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The government response to Fuck tha Police, while not typical, 
likely also chilled political protest speech by other rap musicians, as 
well as artists in other areas, particularly those who have not already 
achieved some degree of success and financial security. 
Government pressure on political protest in rap continues in the 
present day and extends to Caucasian rappers, as evidenced by the 
treatment of Marshall Mathers, known professionally as Eminem.256 
Mathers reported that Secret Service agents questioned him 
following his critique of President Donald Trump in a freestyle rap 
on the 2017 Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) Hip Hop 
Awards show.257 In short, government responses to rap music 
suggest that those interested in protecting political dissent, including 
domestic violence victim advocates, should consider the advisability 
of a heightened mens rea for public protest context true threats.258 
 
‘Straight Outta Compton’ Album Enters Grammy Hall of Fame, XXL MAG. 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.xxlmag.com/news/2016/11/n-w-a-straight-outta-
compton-album-enters-grammy-hall-of-fame/. Additionally, the Library of 
Congress’s National Recording Registry, inducted the entire album Straight 
Outta Compton into its Registry in 2016. Joshua Barone, Judy Garland and 
‘Straight Outta Compton’ Join National Recording Registry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
31, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/arts/music/judy-garland-and-straight-
outta-compton-join-national-recording-registry.html. 
 256 Jessica Schladebeck, Eminem Claims Trump Diss Track Earned Him a 
Visit From Secret Service on New ‘Kamikaze’ Album, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 31, 
2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-news-
eminem-trump-secret-service-kamikaze-album-20180831-story.html. The Secret 
Service would neither confirm nor deny questioning Eminem, but it did comment 
that it investigates all threats against the President. Id. 
 257 EMINEM, Like Home, on REVIVAL (Aftermath Entertainment, Shady 
Records & Interscope Records 2017) (“Someone get this Aryan a sheet / Time to 
bury him, so tell him to prepare to get impeached / Everybody on your feet / This 
is where terrorism and heroism meet, square off in the street”); Schladebeck, 
supra note 256 (“In the third verse of ‘The Ringer,’ Eminem claims his 2017 
freestyle for the BET Hip Hop Awards earned him a visit from the Secret 
Service.”); EMINEM, The Ringer, on KAMIKAZE (Aftermath Entertainment, Shady 
Records & Interscope Records 2018) (“But I know at least he’s heard it / ‘Cause 
Agent Orange just sent the Secret Service / To meet in person to see if I really 
think of hurtin’ him”). 
 258 The subjective test for a true threat has particular significance for political 
dissent because a low mens rea generally results in more emphasis on the 
objective test and studies suggest such tests are vulnerable to implicit bias. See, 
e.g., Brief of the Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner 
at 13, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) (noting that 
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3. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF 
THREATS 
In addition to the particular importance of political speech, the 
decision to pursue a public life, with the consequent understanding 
of the potential for threats, offers some justification for the provision 
of greater constitutional protection for speech on matters of public 
concern. Unfortunately, for a significant number of public officials, 
whether working at a national or local level, election or appointment 
to their posts brings threats of violence, including death threats.259 
Public figures also face threats of violence on a regular basis.260 
Advance knowledge of the risk, and, in many instances, the 
likelihood of threats while in the public eye, presumably renders 
receipt of threats somewhat more tolerable for government officials 
and public figures. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 
emphasizes the Court’s expectation that public officials and figures 
must endure harsher public criticism than other individuals in order 
to protect core political speech consistent with the First Amendment, 
even when such speech causes severe emotional harm.261 Hustler 
involved a lawsuit brought by televangelist and political 
 
the objective test can be applied in a biased manner because factfinders are asked 
“whether a reasonable person would feel afraid” but “[s]tereotypes, prejudices . . . 
can all contribute to fear, regardless of whether a comment is actually 
intimidating.”). 
 259 See, e.g., Isaac Avilucea, Mayor Kelly Yaede Receives Death Threat, 
Woman in Video Shouts, ‘I Wanna Kill You Right Now,’ TRENTONIAN (June 11, 
2019), https://www.trentonian.com/news/mayor-kelly-yaede-receives-death-
threat-woman-in-video-shouts/article_9b03ac6e-8c60-11e9-9a65-
5344d2500882.html; Biran Lisi, School Board Receives Death Threats Following 
Arrest and Forcible Removal of Teacher at Meeting, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018, 
10:59 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/school-board-death-
threats-teacher-removed-meeting-article-1.3748559. 
 260 See, e.g., Todd Malm, Cardi B Cancels Concert in Indianapolis Due to 
Security Threat, CELEBRITY INSIDER (July 31, 2019, 5:27 PM), 
https://celebrityinsider.org/cardi-b-cancels-concert-in-indianapolis-due-to-
security-threat-307041/; Amy Mackelden, Meghan Markle Avoids Newspapers 
and Twitter Following Racist Abuse, HARPER’S BAZAAR (March 9, 2019, 10:57 
AM), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/celebrity/latest/a26771371/meghan-
markle-online-trolls-racist-abuse-avoids-twitter/. 
 261 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that a 
public figure cannot recover intentional infliction of emotional distress damages 
without proving “a false statement of fact made with ‘actual malice.’”). 
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commentator Reverend Jerry Falwell, in response to a “highly 
offensive” parody of him in Hustler magazine.262 Recognizing that 
“robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is 
bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public 
office,” the Court applied the New York Times heightened mens rea 
standard for defamation against a public official to this case 
involving public figure.263 However, the Court did not suggest it 
would consider imposing a similar requirement for a private person 
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.264 Rather, 
in the defamation context, the Court has stated “private individuals 
are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and 
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”265 
Threats of violence presumably cause more aggregate emotional 
harm than other types of speech sufficient for a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. However, the principle that public 
protest context speech warrants a heightened level of constitutional 
protection that is unavailable for private context speech remains the 
same.266 In sum, the Court’s reasoning in Hustler, along with its 
other defamation cases and incitement jurisprudence, offer support 
for an approach to true threats that provides greater protection for 
speech impacting public officials than for words harming private 
individuals.267 
Some might question the feasibility of a multi-tiered approach 
to the subjective test for true threats and argue that such a standard 
would be difficult to implement. However, the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding defamation jurisprudence belies this concern in that it 
has developed to include a greater number of analytical variables 
than the proposed approach to true threats.268 In addition, the 
 
 262 Id. at 48 (describing that the parody depicted Falwell’s first sexual 
encounter as occurring with his mother in an outhouse). 
 263 Id. at 50–51 (defining public figures as those “intimately involved in the 
resolution of important public questions or, [who] by reason of their fame, shape 
events in areas of concern to society at large.”). 
 264 See id. at 49. 
 265 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
 266 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52. 
 267 Cf. id. at 51, 57. 
 268 See Batchis supra note 183, at 49–50 (noting that in addition to 
distinguishing between public official, public figures, and private individuals 
allegedly defamed by speech on matters of public versus private concern, the 
Supreme Court has varied mens rea requirements-based type of damages at issue). 
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Supreme Court’s concern in Watts for the disruption caused by true 
threats applied with special force to threats against the President 
may suggest a potential objection to a purpose or knowledge 
standard for true threats in the public protest context.269 However, 
Congress has historically chosen a specific intent standard with 
respect to federal laws banning threats against the President despite 
undoubtedly wishing to deter threats which interfere with 
governmental functions.270 In addition, caselaw suggests that many 
individuals who utter threats against the President, as well as other 
prominent officials and public figures, will not be deterred by a low 
requisite mens rea for true threat liability.271 In short, the Court’s 
offhand comments in Watts should not be read as suggesting that it 
would find the Constitution required a low mens rea for true threats 
in the public protest context. 
Finally, some have argued that the advent of the Internet and 
other technologies, which have increased the frequency of all types 
of threats, suggest that a First Amendment requirement of a purpose 
or knowledge standard for true threats will offer insufficient 
protection for victims.272 Others have argued that the dynamics of 
new communication channels render assessment of the intentions of 
 
 269 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
 270 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2018) (requiring knowledge and willfulness 
for conviction). 
 271 High profile public officials often draw attention and threats from people 
with mental health issues and political extremists willing to risk criminal liability 
for their causes. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 41–42 (1975) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (describing how a man suffering from alcoholism 
wandered into coffee shop stating that he was Jesus Christ and that he was “going 
to go to Washington to ‘whip Nixon’s ass,’ or to ‘kill him in order to save the 
United States.’”); Kelly Weill et al., Congressional Shooter Loved Bernie, Hated 
‘Racist’ Republicans, and Beat His Daughter, DAILY BEAST, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/congressional-shooter-loved-bernie-sanders-
hated-racist-and-sexist-republicans (last updated June 14, 2017, 11:56 PM) (“The 
gunman who attacked members of Congress on Wednesday morning . . . had a 
long history of domestic violence that included the use of a gun and hated 
Republicans.”). 
 272 See, e.g., Alison J. Best, Note, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold 
Individual Rights to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True 
Threats, 75 MD. L. REV. 1127, 1155 (2016) (discussing role of Internet in rise of 
true threat litigation in the last decade and arguing in part that “applying a purely 
subjective intent standard raises concerns that true threats would be too hard to 
prove in the context of social media.”). 
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a speaker threatening violence more difficult, and they recommend 
additional legal protections for those accused of uttering true threats 
to avoid overdeterrence of legitimate speech.273 Since 
communication technologies continue to evolve rapidly and strong 
arguments exist that these developments raise challenges for both 
alleged victims and defendants in true threat litigation,274 it seems 
ill-advised to attempt to build detailed rules for true threat 
jurisprudence on the basis of such issues.275 In sum, the high value 
of core political speech and its relative vulnerability to self-
censorship, as well as the assumption of the risk of threats by public 
officials and figures, warrant a heightened mens rea for public 
protest context true threats pursuant to the First Amendment. 
B. Lower Mens Rea for Private Context Threats 
In contrast to threats in the public protest context, threats of 
violence against private individuals, and threats against public 
officials and figures that are not part of a public critique, have little 
or no First Amendment value to potentially outweigh the injury 
caused by the speech.276 In this regard, private context threats 
resemble defamation of a private figure and thus merit a lower level 
 
 273 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I [gun 
emoji] U: Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 CAL. L REV. 1886, 
1925 (2018) (advocating creation of a procedural mechanism for raising a 
“context” defense to a prosecution for threats on social media prior to trial). 
 274 Jessica L. Opila, Note, How Elonis Failed to Clarify the Analysis of “True 
Threats” in Social Media Cases and the Subsequent Need for Congressional 
Response, 24 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 97 (2017). 
 275 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[W]e 
cannot appreciate yet [the Cyber Age’s] full dimensions and vast potential to alter 
how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.”); Reno v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the 
Internet].”). 
 276 Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 27 (“[Negligence] may be a low 
standard, but to my mind, it doesn’t eliminate a whole lot of valuable speech at 
all.”); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[R]estricting speech 
on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as 
limiting speech on matters of public interest: [T]here is no threat to the free and 
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful 
dialog of ideas; and the threat of liability does not pose the risk of a reaction of 
self-censorship on matters of public import.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
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of constitutional protection via the mens rea requirement than public 
protest context threats. Specifically, the Supreme Court should find 
that, for a statement to qualify as a true threat, the Constitution 
requires a subjective intent to threaten reflecting at least 
recklessness on the part of the speaker for criminal law cases and a 
general intent to communicate a true threat, but without regard to 
any intent to threaten, in civil matters. 
Several considerations beyond the analogy to defamation and 
the assumption of a risk of threats by public officials and figures 
discussed above support a reading of the First Amendment to require 
a lower mens rea to prove a true threat in the private versus public 
protest context. First, at the time he receives a true threat, a 
government official or public figure will be more likely to have 
protection already in place at work, and occasionally at home as 
well, and to have access to increased protection in response to a 
threat than a private person.277 Access to enhanced public resources 
for protection will presumably reduce the actual risk of violence for 
a public official or figure and may also blunt the emotional harm of 
a threat.278 In addition, the costs of self-help “remedies” for a threat 
of violence, such as privately contracted security personnel, are 
more likely to be financially accessible to the subset of public 
officials and public figures most likely to receive death threats, 
namely individuals with high profile government positions or with 
celebrity status in the popular culture, than to other threat victims.279 
Second, with threats communicated through a private channel, 
the particular harm suffered by any victim, whether a public or 
private individual, suggests the need to limit the application of a 
heightened (purpose or knowledge) mens rea for true threats to only 
those threats uttered in the context of a public protest against public 
officials and figures. For example, a threat communicated through a 
private channel “will often involve an invasion of personal space (a 
 
 277 See Donald J. Mihalek & Richard M. Frankel, Protecting US Government 
Leaders: Who Gets Security and Why: Analysis, ABC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019, 5:06 
AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/protecting-us-government-leaders-
security-analysis/story?id=66258938. 
 278 See id. 
 279 See, e.g., Kenzie Bryant, The Staggering Price Tag on Safety in the Modern 
Celebrity World, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 4, 2016), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2016/11/bodyguard-security-cost-kim-
kardashian-brad-pitt. 
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phone call to the home, for example) that increases the target’s sense 
of assault and denies the target any sense of personal refuge or 
margin of safety from antagonists.”280 Unlike public protest context 
threats, privately communicated threats have “inherently ominous 
overtones” and thus cause special harm regardless of the target’s 
identity.281 When a government official receives a threat in private, 
even when coupled with a reference to a matter of public concern, 
she can reasonably assume the speaker does not seek to influence 
the marketplace of ideas but instead wishes to intimidate or coerce 
her.282 Threats of violence communicated through private channels 
to a government official do not advance a broader political 
discussion.283 
Finally, with respect to private context threats, the victim will 
generally have personal connections with the individual making the 
threat, rendering total avoidance of that person following a threat 
difficult.284 For example, Elonis threatened his estranged wife who, 
as a result of their having two minor children in common, would 
 
 280 Gey, supra note 230, at 1351. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 1350–51. Cases involving true threats directed at public officials on 
matters of public concern may occasionally present difficulties in discerning 
whether those threats were publicly or privately communicated (i.e., a threat 
indicating that the speaker will kill the target if he doesn’t vote for particular 
legislation sent directly to a legislator’s work email address but also cc’ing several 
of the speaker’s friends or family members). See Healy, supra note 237, at 724 
(discussing challenges in determining whether speech is public or private in the 
context of incitement). 
 283 See, e.g., United States v. Hoff, 767 F. App’x 614, 622 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(defendant left voicemail messages for his Congressman which included 
statements such as, “[l]eave Obamacare alone or die.”); United States v. Haddad, 
652 F. App’x 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant sent letters to local elected 
officials and to oil executives stating “[w]e will so happily and without mercy kill 
your families.”). It is also worth noting that not all threats of violence against 
public officials in a public setting automatically warrant First Amendment 
protection. A person who publicly spews mere personal animus against a 
politician that includes a threat of violence but does not refer to matters of public 
concern fails to offer any contribution to public debate which the Constitution 
aims to protect. 
 284 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004, 2006 (2016) (noting 
that defendant threatened his wife which prompted her to seek a restraining order 
for her and their shared children). 
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almost certainly face future contact with him.285 Each time a private 
individual interacts with a person who has threatened her, the 
contact could retraumatize the victim, compounding the emotional 
injury from the initial threat.286 However, in most instances, the lack 
of a social or an ongoing work related connection will enable public 
officials and figures to avoid future contact with people who have 
publicly threatened them, thus reducing their risk of suffering actual 
violence.287 For example, Elonis also threatened an FBI agent who, 
unlike Elonis’ estranged wife, did not have a personal connection to 
him and thus could cease all contact with him following the 
conclusion of her investigation or perhaps the transfer of that 
investigation to another agent.288 A person threatened in a private 
context will also be more likely to feel betrayed by the speaker 
because of the likelihood of a prior relationship, whereas such 
feelings are not generally present for the target of a public protest 
context threat.289 Thus, the heightened victim impact of a privately 
communicated threat weighs in favor of a lower mens rea for such 
 
 285 Id. at 2004. For domestic violence victims who have children in common 
with a former intimate partner, courts often include visitation orders to prohibit or 
limit contact between a victim and a domestic violence perpetrator. See Debrina 
Washington, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Cases, VERY 
WELL FAMILY, https://www.verywellfamily.com/domestic-violence-in-child-
custody-cases-2997623 (last updated Sept. 12, 2019) (discussing the impact on 
visitation rights for an accused). However, perpetrators frequently do not comply 
with these terms imposing contact limitations. Melanie F. Shepard & Annelies K. 
Hagemeister, Perspectives of Rural Women: Custody and Visitation with Abusive 
Ex-Partners, 28 J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 165, 167, 171 (2013). 
 286 Shepard & Hagemeister, supra note 285, at 171. This argument also applies 
to public officials and figures threatened through private channels. See Hoff, 767 
F. App’x at 620–23. 
 287 In the case of elected officials, however, First Amendment concerns attach 
when trying to block constituents on social media. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 
666, 672–73 (2019) (holding that the chair of a county Board of Supervisors could 
not block one of her constituents on Facebook). 
 288 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006. 
 289 Privately communicated threats against public officials addressing matters 
of public concern will likewise not cause feelings of personal betrayal unless the 
victim happens to have a relationship with the speaker. In any event, under the 
multi-tiered approach proposed in this Article, such private context threats would 
be subject to a lower mens rea. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 42 
(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the threat made by defendant to 
officers at a hotel against the President). 
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threats whether against public officials, public figures, or private 
individuals. 
Some have argued that a purpose or knowledge standard for true 
threats renders threatening speech likely, and thus serves to expose 
potential violence to prevention efforts by law enforcement.290 With 
respect to public officials and figures, it seems reasonable to assume 
that a heightened mens rea which maximizes free speech protections 
will expose potential threats through volatile public expression and 
thereby allow for action to increase safety. However, with respect to 
threats against private individuals, the threat target is likely to have 
a prior relationship with the speaker and thus to be already aware of 
the speaker’s ill will.291 As a result, although a heightened mens rea 
requirement will generally provide more frequent alerts to potential 
danger, it would likely offer little new information to improve the 
safety of private individuals threatened with violence. 
1. RECKLESSNESS STANDARD FOR TRUE THREATS IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 
The limited First Amendment value of private context threats 
and their high degree of resultant harm argue against a finding that 
the Constitution requires a specific intent (purpose or knowledge) 
standard for true threat liability. In addition, such a heightened mens 
rea would make prosecutions exceedingly difficult in some cases, 
including those involving domestic violence for victims who seek to 
pursue criminal charges. However, the aversion of many victims to 
policies focusing on criminal legal system solutions in response to 
domestic violence, to crime in general, or to both, suggests that a 
low mens rea requirement pursuant to the First Amendment for true 
threat prosecutions would not be in line with their wishes.292 In the 
aggregate, the differing perspectives of domestic violence victims 
suggest that interpreting the Constitution to require an intermediary 
 
 290 Scholars have referred to this justification for a more permissive subjective 
test for true threats as the visibility of danger rationale. See e.g., Daniel T. Kobil, 
Advocacy On Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the Internet Era, 31 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 227, 238 (2000); see also Marc Rohr, “Threatening” Speech: The 
Thin Line Between Implicit Threats, Solicitation, and Advocacy of Crime 27 
(Nova Southeastern Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 14-002), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2501042. 
 291 See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006 (2015). 
 292 See supra Section II.C. 
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level of intent for a criminal conviction for uttering a private context 
true threat, namely recklessness on the part of the speaker as to an 
intent to threaten, would best serve victim interests overall.293 
Some jurisdictions have interpreted statutes criminalizing 
threats to require a purpose to threaten for conviction and, in 
prosecutions pursuant to such laws, the question of the mens rea 
required by the Constitution for a true threat becomes moot.294 
However, in jurisdictions which currently allow conviction based 
solely on intent to communicate a true threat, meeting the objective 
test, a First Amendment requirement of recklessness with respect to 
the intent to threaten will increase the difficulty of proving criminal 
liability.295 In these instances, the proposed subjective test 
(recklessness) for private context true threats in criminal cases will 
increase the importance of victim cooperation in prosecutions, and 
thus has the potential to enhance respect for victim autonomy. 
2. GENERAL INTENT STANDARD FOR TRUE THREATS IN CIVIL 
CASES 
In contrast to criminal prosecutions for true threats, which arise 
in a wide range of circumstances, true threat jurisprudence in civil 
cases is implicated almost exclusively with respect to private 
context threats in civil protection orders; as a result, domestic 
violence victims’ concerns warrant special consideration here.296 In 
 
 293 See supra Section II.C. 
 294 See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 614 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). 
 295 See, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 474, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“an objective test . . . asks only whether a reasonable listener would understand 
the communication as an expression of intent to injure, permitting a conviction 
not because the defendant intended his words to constitute a threat to injure 
another but because he should have known others would see it that way.”). 
 296 See, e.g., Parocha v. Parocha, 418 P.3d 523, 526 (Colo. 2018) (civil 
protection order based on private threats to wife); Ngqakayi v. Ngqayaki, No. 
2007 CA 85, 2008 WL 4278334, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008) 
(involving civil protection order for threat in private context); Henry v. Henry, 
No. 04CA2781, 2005 WL 43888, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (involving civil 
protection order for husband’s death threats to wife in private). True threat issues 
may also be raised occasionally in the tort context in jurisdictions recognizing 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. See Julie A. Davies, Direct 
Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1992). In addition, civil cases involving true threats and related First Amendment 
arguments arise in the context of students suing school boards or other school 
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the civil context, the Supreme Court should find that a subjective 
intent to communicate a statement qualifying as a true threat 
pursuant to the objective test satisfies any free speech concerns. 
Victim interests support a low mens rea for true threats, maximizing 
access to civil protection orders, for a number of reasons.297 
First, as discussed, domestic violence victims suffer more 
acutely from the negative effects of true threats than many other 
threat victims, which in turn justifies a lower mens rea with respect 
to civil cases than in criminal matters.298 Second, the effects of the 
entry of a civil protection order against a defendant, while 
significant, are much less severe than the consequences of a criminal 
conviction, and thus a lower mens rea here causes fewer concerns 
regarding excessive speech regulation than it would in the criminal 
context.299 
While some jurists may question whether a basis exists upon 
which to apply a lower mens rea to true threats in civil versus 
criminal cases, this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
use of penalty-sensitive free speech analysis in its First Amendment 
jurisprudence, albeit in a limited number of cases to date.300 As 
Professor Michael Coenen has explained, penalty-sensitive free 
speech analysis looks to the constitutionality of a speech limitation 
in light of the severity of the criminal punishment or civil penalty 
attached to it.301 In doing so, penalty sensitivity “posits a positive 
correlation between the harshness of the governmental sanction and 
 
authorities following discipline for allegedly threatening speech. See, e.g., Student 
Accused of Making Online Threats Directed at Emmerich Manual High School 
Arrested, supra note 164. However, in school cases involving threats, a different 
standard applies pursuant to Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 297 See supra Section II.B. 
 298 See supra Section II.A. 
 299 Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic 
Violence Victims, Defendants, and Due Process, 35 CARDOZO L. R. 141, 151, 174 
(2013) (describing the range of potential collateral consequences for defendants 
of civil protection orders, including criminal record notations and firearms 
restrictions). 
 300 Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive 
Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2012) 
[hereinafter Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions]. 
 301 Id. at 1000. 
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the strength of the speaker’s First Amendment claim.”302 While the 
concept of penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis remains the 
subject of debate, it has garnered increasing scholarly recognition in 
recent years.303 Further support for the proposed approach to true 
threats may also be found in other areas of constitutional law 
reflecting penalty sensitivity by distinguishing between rights 
available in civil and criminal cases (i.e., right to counsel).304 
Third, any determination that liability for a true threat requires 
proof of the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten “will create a 
significant hurdle to the issuance of protection orders for 
victims.”305 While subjective intent is “by its nature . . . difficult to 
demonstrate,”306 establishing intent would likely be more 
challenging in domestic violence matters, as compared to other true 
threat cases, due to the special ability of many domestic violence 
perpetrators for deception.307 Domestic violence perpetrators gain 
 
 302 Id. 
 303 See, e.g., id. at 995 (arguing “[p]enalty-sensitive free speech may be less 
prevalent than its penalty-neutral counterpart, but it is by no means non-
existent.”); Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1533, 1601 (2017) (arguing that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes discussed 
“speech specific, penalty-sensitive concerns” in his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)); Margo Kaminski, Copyright Crime and 
Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 
587, 590 (2014) (arguing “courts should . . . reintegrate elements of 
proportionality analysis into First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment 
Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L L. & POL’Y 409, 
441 (2013) (arguing for the application of the balancing test in Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), in the context of civil and administrative sanctions 
and strict scrutiny for criminal sanctions). 
 304 Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions, supra note 300, at 1022–26; see also 
Batchis supra note 183, at 44 (suggesting “[a] nuanced doctrinal rule governing 
the true threats category might distinguish among various possible sanctions that 
would apply to true threats” with “[a] higher level of intent . . . required to ratchet-
up the sanctions imposed.”). 
 305 Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project 
and Professor Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 28–29. 
 306 United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 307 POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL, supra note 108; see also Wheels, DOMESTIC 
ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/ (last 
accessed Jan. 26, 2020) (describing Power and Control Wheel utilized by wide 
range of professionals including court personnel, law enforcement, and 
prosecutors in the United States as well as other countries). 
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and maintain power and control over their victims with a range of 
abusive behaviors, many of which involve manipulation, as perhaps 
best represented in the Power and Control Wheel developed by 
domestic violence experts.308 Abusive behavioral strategies include 
responding to domestic violence allegations by “minimizing, 
denying [the abuse], and blaming [the victim].”309 In true threat 
litigation, perpetrators can use these manipulative skills to claim that 
they had no intent to threaten the victim, but rather merely sought to 
“vent their frustration, to make a joke, [or] to express themselves 
artistically.”310 Domestic violence perpetrators tend to be successful 
in deceiving fact finders as to their intentions, and research 
establishes that fact finders demonstrate bias on issues of credibility 
in favor of perpetrators to the detriment of domestic violence 
victims.311 
Further complicating problems of proof for a domestic violence 
victim, a former intimate partner can use facially ambiguous words 
that nonetheless clearly communicate a threat to her based on the 
couple’s shared history, which can then aid the defendant in his 
efforts to deny his intent to threaten her.312 During oral argument in 
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Elonis, Justice Alito recognized that a heightened mens rea for true 
threats would pose special problems for domestic violence victims, 
commenting that such a rule would offer “a roadmap for threatening 
a spouse and getting away with it” by “put[ting] [the threat] in rhyme 
and . . . say[ing], I’m an aspiring rap artist.”313 
Finally, whereas in criminal cases, implicit bias concerns 
generally focus on discrimination against defendants, in civil 
protection order cases, implicit bias will be more likely to 
disadvantage domestic violence victims than defendants.314 
Specifically, because most intimate partner pairings in the United 
States are monoracial and the vast majority of domestic violence 
victims are women, to the extent implicit or explicit biases factor 
into civil protection order decisions, an inference can be drawn that 
gender will generally be the most salient point on which implicit 
bias may impact outcomes.315 Given research findings that the 
majority of Americans hold implicit biases in many areas in favor 
of men over women, in civil protection order cases, any gender bias 
will generally inure in favor of male defendants.316 Similarly, with 
respect to bias against immigrants, domestic violence victims are 
more likely to be immigrants—particularly undocumented 
immigrants—than their former intimate partners, given the 
dynamics of power and control inherent in domestic violence.317 As 
a result, any bias against immigrants in adjudicating civil protection 
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order cases will likely favor defendants. Full consideration of all 
potential types of implicit bias which can arise in civil protection 
order hearings is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as the 
foregoing analysis suggests, domestic violence victims, rather than 
defendants, are more likely to be disadvantaged by implicit bias in 
civil protection order cases.318 In sum, in light of the serious harm 
true threats cause domestic violence victims and the relatively 
modest consequences of a civil protection order for defendants in 
comparison to criminal penalties, as well as the disadvantages faced 
by domestic violence victims in litigating these cases, the balance 
weighs in favor of a subjective test requiring only a general intent to 
communicate an objective true threat for liability. 
CONCLUSION 
True threat jurisprudence offers the opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to utilize insights from First Amendment decisions regarding 
other categories of unprotected speech, particularly defamation and 
incitement, to reflect the optimal constitutional balancing of free 
speech rights and protection of individuals, in particular domestic 
violence victims, from harm. In light of this guidance, the Court 
should use a multi-tiered approach to the question of the 
constitutionally requisite mens rea that must be coupled with a 
finding pursuant to the objective test for a true threat. This multi-
tiered standard should require, first, that public protest context 
threats of violence (i.e., against public officials and figures and 
publicly communicated on matters of public concern) receive 
heightened constitutional protection: a specific intent to threaten 
(purpose or knowledge) standard for liability. Second, private 
context threats (i.e., privately communicated threats whether against 
private individuals or public officials or figures) should require an 
intermediate level of subjective intent to threaten (recklessness) for 
a criminal conviction. Finally, for entry of a civil protection order or 
other civil judgment, private context threats should require only a 
general intent to communicate an objectively threatening statement 
and not a subjective, specific intent to threaten. True threat 
jurisprudence gives domestic violence advocates an opportunity to 
continue to shift the priorities of the feminist anti-violence 
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movement away from prioritizing criminalization—which has often 
been ineffective and had unintended consequences—to instead 
focus on preventing and remedying domestic violence through civil 
protection orders and other solutions which better reflect the 
concerns of all victims. In working to ensure that true threat 
jurisprudence maximizes civil protection order access and provides 
some level of criminal legal system relief from threats, while also 
offering a heightened constitutional buffer for impassioned political 
protest, advocates can improve society’s effectiveness in responding 
to domestic violence. 
